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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1989 intrafirm trade between the U.S. and other countries accounted for 40.4% 
of total U.S. merchandise trade, with an estimated value of over $330 billion (Tang, 
1993). As of June 1994, the vast majority of tax dollars at issue in the U.S. Tax Court 
related to intrafirm trade and the transfer price used for tax purposes (Schwartz et al, 
1994). The main issue in these cases was the method the multinational used to set 
transfer prices. The policymakers and multinationals have spent a considerable amount 
of time and effort trying to develop transfer pricing methods. The relationship between 
regulated methods and profit maximization could have important current tax policy 
implications particularly because of the large dollar amounts involved and the lack of 
agreement between the parties involved (see Secs. 1.1.1 to 1.1.3). 
1.1 The Transfer Pricing Problem 
The transfer price is the value assigned to goods and services transferred between 
divisions of a company. The value is sales revenue to the division that transferred the 
good or services and a cost to the receiving division. When a company has multinational 
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operations these divisions can be in different countries.1 In the 1970's, taxing authorities, 
particularly the United States, became concerned with the manipulation of transfer 
pricesfor tax purposes. Until this time, multinationals used transfer pricing rather easily 
as a means to shift income between countries thus minimizing global taxes.2 To 
minimize taxes, a high transfer price can be used when the transferring division's tax rate 
is lower thus moving revenues into the low tax country and expenses to the high tax 
country. 
The principle used by the U.S. government, as well as most all of the other 
members of the United Nations, to determine a transfer price is called the arm's length 
principle. Sec. 482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code gives the IRS the authority to 
promulgate regulations to allocate income among divisions of a multinational to reflect 
its true income. Reg. Sec. 1.482-1 (b) defines the standards used in transfer pricing. 
"In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to 
be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if 
the results of the transaction are consistent with the results that would have been 
realized if uncontrolled taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the 
same circumstances (arm's length result)." (emphasis added) 
The arm's length principle has been criticized based on the nature of the 
multinational. For example, one reason a multinational exists is because of the 
economies of scale they can find through related operations (Chandler et al, 1995). · The 
arm's length principle requires the multinational to act as though its divisions are not 
related even though its divisions are related. 
1 The divisions of the multinational are called related parties under Sec. 482. According to Reg. Sec. 
l.482-l(a)(3) the divisions must be "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests'~ The 
rules look to the "reality" of control not the form. 
2 Vaitsos (1974) found that multinationals were overstating transfer prices by an average of 155 percent in 
the pharmaceutical industry, 25 percent in the chemical industry and 40 percent in the rubber industry. 
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The three key players in the transfer pricing arena are the multinational, the 
regulators and the court. To fully comprehend the complexities of this problem, the 
transfer pricing background and goals of each player are investigated below. 
1.1.1 Multinationals 
Multinationals exist because of market imperfections that are used to the firm's 
advantage. Some of the most common market imperfections are labor cost and 
availability differences, location and transportation advantages, technological differences 
and political advantages such as taxes, tariffs, duties, etc. (Leitch & Barrett, 1992). 
Transfer pricing is used to further these advantages. In 1991 Business International 
Corporation and Ernst & Young undertook a study of transfer pricing. Through use of a 
survey and numerous interviews, the authors of this study concluded that the following 
eight items were key objectives of corporate transfer pricing policies (in no particular 
order of priority): 
1) Moving funds internationally, 
2) Minimizing taxes, 
3) Minimizing tariffs, 
4) Avoiding exchange controls and quotas, 
5) Minimizing exchange risks, 
6) Increasing shares of profits from joint ventures, 
7) Optimizing managerial incentives and performance evaluations and 
8) Minimizing customs duties and value-added tax (VAT) exposure. 
1.1.2 Regulators (Congress and the IRS) 
The taxation of multinationals can be thought of as a zero-sum game. Only a 
certain amount of tax payments exists and each country is scrambling to obtain its "fair" 
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share. The fear that the U.S. was not receiving its fair share resulted in members of both 
houses of Congress requesting the General Accounting Office (GAO) to research this 
issue. The GAO researchers did find a majority of multinationals paying no tax in 1991; 
however, they could not entirely tie this finding to transfer pricing abuses (GAO, 1995). 
Bad feelings are not new in the area of transfer pricing. The IRS has long felt that 
multinationals were hiding information on their transfer pricing practices. A 1988 study 
of transfer pricing by the Treasury Department, called "The White Paper," revealed the 
perception on the part of the IRS auditors that multinationals were purposely delaying 
audits and even refusing to make documentation available to keep from having their 
transfer pricing methods audited. 3 
1.1.3 The Courts 
Throughout the 1970's and 80's the courts did their best to adhere to the arm's 
length standard even when it resulted in allocations that did not fit economic reality. 
True arm's length results are found through comparable sales such as in a competitive 
market place. Since multinationals often do not operate under perfect competition, any 
comparables that were found probably had been affected by the multinational.4 
In the 1990's the courts realized that where a comparable transaction clearly did 
not reflect economic reality, some other means would have to be used. Cases were 
solved by the court arbitrarily assigning an amount, usually between what the taxpayer 
3 As of 1992 the IRS continues to feel that multinationals are hiding their transfer pricing methods and 
purposes, in spite of numerous documentation regulations. Interview with Tax Counsel James Mogle 
Transfer Pricing Report 419 (1992). 
4 This problem became apparent in cases such as Sunstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226, Merck & 
Co., Inc., v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct 73, 91-2 USTC 50,456 and Bausch & Lomb, Inc., v. Commissioner, 
933 F.2d 1084 (Avi-Yonah, 1995). 
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wanted and what the IRS wanted, and calling it arm's length.5 Since no one method or 
side consistently wins the court cases, no definitive conclusion on setting a transfer price 
has been made. The main conclusion is, absent comparables, the courts look to the most 
reasonable allocation that appears to reflect economic reality. See Table I for a listing of 
the most recent court cases with the court's decisions. 
1.2 Prior Studies of Transfer Pricing 
The vast majority of transfer pricing studies have been empirical studies 
examining how the multinational sets a transfer price and what factors affect this 
decision. 6 The rest are normative studies using economic-based and goal programming 
methodologies. They explore how the multinational should set the transfer price and 
have found that the profit maximizing transfer price results in resource allocation 
distortions. The study of Halperin & Srinidhi (1987, 1991 and 1997) represents the only 
analytical study to combine profit maximization and transfer pricing by examining 
specific transfer pricing methodologies. 
1.3 Purpose and Research Issues Addressed in the Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to determine the effect of tariffs, partial 
ownership, taxes and regulated transfer pricing methods on the transfer price and resource 
allocation decisions of the multinational. The research questions are addressed using the 
theory of profit-maximization. This study considers the impact of tariffs and partial 
ownership on a firms' productions decisions when faced with a regulated transfer pricing 
method. The following questions are addressed in this study. 
5 In Perkin-Elmer Corp., 66 T.C.M (CCH) 634, the court decided part of the issues under consideration 
completely on the taxpayer's side because neither side, taxpayer nor IRS, had actually proven their case. 
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1. What is the impact of tariffs, taxes and regulated methods on a firms' production 
decisions? To answer this question, frrst tariffs are analyzed, second taxes are added to 
the analysis and finally regulated transfer pricing methods are introduced. 
2. What is the impact of less than full ownership, taxes and regulated transfer pricing 
methods on the firms' production decisions? To answer this question, frrst benchmark 
resource allocations are found under less than full ownership, second, taxes are added to 
the analysis and finally, regulated methods are introduced. This analysis is done under 
two different scenarios: when a market price does exist and when it does not exist. 
Analytical methodology has been used in tax research for many years. Analytical 
research is implemented by making certain assumptions about economic behavior and the 
issue being studied. Mathematics is used as a tool to make logical conclusions that hold 
based on the assumptions. Analytical research is used "to get insights into how some part 
of the tax law may affect economic behavior when data is nonexistent or unavailable". 
Much of the tax research done by accountants makes use of tests or principles developed 
mathematically. 7 
1.4 Contribution of the Study 
The primary contribution of this study is the extension of the theory of transfer 
pricing with regulated transfer pricing methods. This study is different from the Halperin 
and Srinidhi study because it first extends their model to tariffs and then modifies it to 
allow partial ownership. As previously mentioned in Sec. 1.1.1, a study on the key 
objectives of corporate transfer pricing policies found both tariffs and partial ownership 
6 Leitch & Barrett (1992) and Borkowski (1996) review these empirical studies. 
7 The information in this paragraph was based on Chapter 1 Analytical Methodology in Tax Research by 
Robert Halperin, in A Guide to Tax Research Methodologies. 
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(through joint ventures) to be two of these objectives (Business, 1991). Therefore, these 
two variables are also important to the theory of transfer pricing. 
This study makes a contribution, through the tariff extension, by determining a 
tariff that could be used by domestic governments to remove resource allocation 
distortions while keeping regulations intact. In the partial ownership analysis, this study 
makes a contribution by determining the ownership percentage multinationals should use 
to obtain increased profits from tax differentials between countries. 
1.5 Organization of the Study 
The next chapter reviews the current transfer pricing methodologies and their 
backgrounds. The third chapter contains a literature review of other analytical studies of 
profit maximizing transfer prices. The fourth chapter explains the basic transfer pricing 
model used in the analytics. The fifth and sixth chapters contain the answers to the 
research questions listed previously involving tariffs and partial ownership, respectively. 
The final chapter includes a summary, extensions and limitations of this study. 
Four appendices follow Chapter VII. Appendix A contains numerical illustrations · 
of the transfer pricing decision with tariffs. Appendix B provides numerical illustrations 
of the transfer pricing decision with a less-than wholly owned subsidiary. Appendix C 
contains the following: Tables I and II contain background information on transfer 
pricing from court cases and firms; Table III provides numerical examples of three 
transfer pricing methods; Tables IV to XIII contain conclusions of the regulated transfer 
pricing methods analysis; and finally for ease of reading, Table XIV summarizes the 
notation used in the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
TRANSFER PRICING METHODOLOGIES 
Five regulatory transfer pricing methods exist for use by multinationals. These 
methods are outlined in the federal tax regulations. Section 2.1 explains the five: (1) 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price, (2) Resale Price Method, (3) Cost Plus Method, (4) 
Comparable Profits Method and (5) Profit Split Method. Section 2.2 examines the 
background and differences in these methods. 
2.1 Transfer Pricing Methodologies - Regulations 
Reg. Sec. 1.482-3, outlines five different transfer pricing methods that are used to 
determine the taxable income for a transfer of tangible property. The first method is the 
comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP method). This method involves using the 
market price of the good as the transfer price between divisions of the multinational 
(called controlled parties). The problem encountered in this method is finding a market 
price for the good being transferred. Quite often transfers between subsidiaries involve 
goods that do not have a ready market. The IRS recognizes this problem and instructs the 
multinational to find comparable transactions by unrelated parties ( called uncontrolled 
transactions) and adapt them to their particular circumstances. If necessary the price is 
adjusted for several different factors listed in Reg. Sec. l.482-3(b)(2)(ii)(B). This method 
can become rather difficult unless a ready market exists for the good being transferred. 
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The second method, called the resale price method, is used when a ready market 
for the intermediate product does not exist. Under this method the transfer price is found 
by subtracting a markup from the selling price of the final good. This markup is 
calculated by multiplying the final product's selling price by the gross profit percentage 
(gross profit/sales) which is earned by the buying/reselling division on similar final 
products in uncontrolled transactions. As under the first method, the transaction is 
analyzed and possible adjustments are made according to the differences between the two 
transactions. The resale price method is recommended when the buying/reselling 
division does not add substantial value to the product. 
The third method is the cost plus method. Under this method the transfer price is 
calculated by adding a gross profit to the foreign affiliate's cost of producing the good. 
The gross profit is found by multiplying the cost by the gross profit markup (gross 
profit/cost of sales) earned by the selling/manufacturing division on similar intermediate 
products in uncontrolled transactions. Once again the uncontrolled transaction is 
analyzed and adjustments made based on the differences. This method is recommended 
if the most similar intermediate product is found in the selling/manufacturing division. 
In the fourth method, the comparable profits method, profit level indicators from 
third parties are used to decide whether the profit or loss in a controlled transaction is 
arm's length. The method tests whether a controlled party is making approximately the 
same profit as uncontrolled parties. Profit level indicators specifically mentioned in the 
regulations are: (1) operating profits/operating assets, (2) operating profits/sales and (3) 
gross profit/operating expenses. 
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In the fifth method, the profit split method, two different allocation methods are 
introduced: the comparable profit split method and the residual profit split method. In 
the comparable profit split method the operating profit of all controlled parties is 
allocated on the basis of the allocation of profits between uncontrolled parties engaging in 
similar transactions. In the residual profit split method the first step is to find the rate of 
return, earned by uncontrolled similar parties, on routine business activities and apply the 
rate to the transactions of related parties. This is done to give every related party in the 
transaction an income amount based on its routine contributions to the relevant business 
activity. The second step is to assign the residual or remaining profit to each related party 
based on their relative contributions. 
2.2 Background of Transfer Pricing Methodologies 
As of 1994, the first three methods discussed above were the primary methods 
used for tax purposes in the U.S. An item included in the Treasury Department's 1988 
"White Paper" was a survey of IRS examiners concerning their experiences with transfer 
pricing cases. A question in the survey concerned which method the examiners used to 
make adjustments in their transfer pricing cases. In proposing tangible property 
adjustments, 31 % used the CUP method, 18% the resale price method, 3 7% the cost plus 
method and 14% an 'other' method. Tang (1993) did a survey of 143 multinationals. 
Table II includes the per method percentage results for both domestic and international 
transfers. Since the Tang study does not make a distinction between methods for tangible 
and intangible property, a direct comparison is not possible. However, it does appear 
that, at the time of these studies, a cost plus type method is the most widely used method 
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followed by the CUP method (market based) and the resale price method (adjusted 
market price). 
In the 1990's both the United States and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) added the fourth and fifth methods, the 
comparable profits and profit split methods.8 Since the final U.S. regulations just came 
out in July of 1994, not much actual work has been done on these two methods.9 Both of 
these methods involve the use of third-party (competitor's) information to perform the 
calculations. Both methods were designed to be used for intangible property although 
there is no specific disallowance for their use for tangible property. 
8 Many other countries including Canada, Japan and South Korea also base their transfer pricing 
regulations on these five methods. · In addition all of these countries and the U.S. allow the multinational to 
use another reasonable method even if not detailed out in the tax code. However the multinational must be 
ready to defend their method and show how it achieves an arm's length result better than the five detailed 
methods. 
9 Halperin and Srinidhi (1996) analytically modeled these two methods for intangible property see 
literature review. 
11 
CHAPTER III 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This study investigates the impact of partial ownership and tariffs on the resource 
allocations of a firm. The transfer pricing decision has been studied in both the 
accounting and economics literature. The main body of the research has been on the 
incentive effects of transfer pricing. A much smaller amount has been done on the 
multinationals reaction to regulated transfer pricing methods. The areas pertinent to this 
study include: transfer pricing and ownership methods, transfer pricing and tariffs and 
transfer pricing and regulated methods. This literature review contains summaries of 
studies in these particular areas of interest. 
3. I Transfer Pricing and Partial Ownership 
Kant (1988) 
The objective of this study was to examine the multinational's transfer pricing 
strategy when its subsidiary was less than wholly owned and no viable tax constraints 
existed. Using profit maximization theory in a partial equilibrium setting, he modeled a 
multinational that faced both taxes and tariffs. Where a low transfer price was desired for 
a wholly-owned subsidiary or branch, a high transfer price was desired for a less than 
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wholly-owned subsidiary.10 This result holds as long as the ownership percentage 
multiplied by one plus the tariff is less than one. Since one plus the tariff is always 
greater than one, this result is more likely for lower ownership percentages. The 
conclusion was reached that, with the introduction of partial ownership, desiring a high 
transfer pricing is more likely than has been suggested in prior literature. 
3.2 Transfer Pricing and Tariffs 
Horst (1971), Samuelson (1982), and Eden (1985, 1991) are examples of articles 
in the economic literature that include tariffs in their analysis. Each one of these articles 
is reviewed next. In all of these studies, a profit maximizing multinational was modeled 
in a partial equilibrium setting. 
Horst (1971) 
The objective of this study was to characterize the optimal production and transfer 
pricing strategy for a multinational and then show the impact of a change in the tax or 
tariff rate on this strategy. The model in this study included taxes, tariffs and an 
exogenous transfer price. An exogenous transfer price is one that is not affected by 
production volume decisions. The findings in this study depended on whether selling 
prices for final goods sold by the multinational were independent and whether they faced 
increasing or decreasing marginal costs. Overall the following two conclusions were 
made. Under decreasing marginal costs, increasing the tariff affects not only the volume 
of imports but also the direction of imports. Second, multinationals generally desire a 
low transfer price and a high tariff policy renders tax policy impotent. 
10 As previously mentioned, a low transfer price is desired when the transferring divisions tax rate is higher. 
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Samuelson (1982) 
The objective of this study was to examine the changes in production decisions 
when the transfer price is endogenous rather than exogenous. An endogenous transfer 
price is one that is affected by production volume decisions. Taxes and tariffs were 
included in the model of the multinational. Samuelson found that if a high transfer price 
is desired, imports are increased more than in the exogenous case. The results for a low 
transfer price were ambiguous. Samuelson concluded that if multinationals understand 
their influence over arms length prices then governments should take this into account in 
formulating policy. 
Eden (1985) 
The objective of this study was to extend the existing transfer pricing models, 
reviewed above, to include horizontal and vertical integration, an analysis of changes in 
tax, tariffs and exchange rates on the transfer price, the welfare effects of tariffs on intra-
firm trade and the efficiency of transfer price manipulation in response to tariffs and 
corporate tax differentials. Eden's model included taxes, tariffs and exchange rates. The 
primary finding of interest in this study, concerns the impact the tariff has on the transfer 
price set by the multinational. The decision to set a low or high transfer price depends on 
the relationship between the tax rate(s) and the tariff(s). If the tax rate is higher in the 
importing country, the transfer price is set at the highest possible value.II If the tax rate in 
the exporting country is higher than the combination of the tax rate and tariff in the 
importing country, the transfer price is the lowest possible. This could happen whether 
the importing country's tax rate was higher or lower than the exporting country's. 
11 Although this results in a high value for tariffs, it also results in the highest possible expense in the high 
tax country and highest possible revenue in the low tax country. 
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Kant (1988) 
In Kant (1988), the tariff prevented the results from always being opposite 
between a wholly owned and less-than wholly owned subsidiary (see discussion in Sec. 
3 .1 ). Clearly, the presence of a tariff has an impact on the transfer pricing decision. All 
of these prior studies, involving tariffs resulted in comer solutions, highest or lowest 
possible for the transfer price. With the introduction of regulated methods in this study, 
the results for the combination of taxes and tariffs are not always comer solutions. 
Eden (1991) 
The objective of this study was to determine the impact of numerous changes in 
the tax and tariff policies in the U.S. and Canada on U.S. multinationals with Canadian 
subsidiaries production decisions. Eden's model included taxes, tariffs, exchange rates 
and endogenous transfer prices. The analysis showed that, prior to the changes, the 
United States and Canada subsidized new manufacturing investments through 
discouraging dividend remittances and encouraging the use of low transfer prices. After 
the changes, the tax differential widens but regulations tightened and the incentive for 
manipulations is reduced. Eden concludes that income transfers from Canada to the 
United States should increase. 
3.3 Transfer Pricing and Regulated Methods 
Halperin & Srinidhi (1987, 1991, 1996) 
The objective of each of these studies was to explore how multinationals react to 
transfer pricing regulations. Using profit maximization theory in a partial equilibrium 
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framework, each of the three studies include taxes and regulated transfer pricing methods. 
The first two studies model the resale price and cost plus methods. The first study is in a 
centralized organizational framework; the second in a decentralized framework. The 
third study models comparable uncontrolled transaction and comparable profit methods 
for intangible property transfers. All three studies find resource allocation distortions 
occur when regulated methods are introduced. In addition the distortion is in the same 
direction in each study and reflects income shifting to minimize taxes by using a high 
transfer price when the product originates in a low tax country and vice versa in a high 
tax country. The Halperin & Srinidhi (1987) basic transfer pricing model is used in this 
study and is reviewed in Sec. 4.1. 
3 .4 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to review the analytical transfer pricing studies in 
the main areas of interest to this study: partial ownership, tariffs and regulated methods. 
While much work has been done in this area, much more remains to be done. This is 
particularly true for the area of regulated methods. During the late 1980's and into the 
90's, the IRS has concentrated on enforcing the rules in this area. Much of the economic 
literature assumes the multinational has a great deal of latitude in devising a transfer price 
(Kant, 1988). This assumption is becoming more and more unreasonable. Because of the 
increased enforcement, this study should become a timely addition to the currently 
available knowledge concerning transfer pricing. 
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CHAPTER IV 
HALPERIN & SRINIDHI (1987) 
The model used in this study was developed in the Halperin & Srinidhi (1987) 
(H&S) study. The purpose of the H&S study was to explore how multinationals react to 
regulated transfer pricing methods. As was mentioned in the prior chapter, the model in 
H&S used profit maximization theory, which is from the perspective of the firm, and was 
done in a partial equilibrium setting. In this chapter, first the H&S study is reviewed. 
Then the H&S model is presented in mathematical form. 
Sec. 4.1 Review ofH&S Study 
This study examined the effects of the resale price method and the cost plus 
method on the multinationals optimal resource allocation decisions. The effects were 
found by comparing the allocation decision under regulated methods to the allocation 
decisions made with no regulated methods. H&S found distortions when the regulated 
methods were used and the tax rates were different between countries. 
H&S assumed a U.S. based multinational with a wholly-owned manufacturing 
division in a foreign country and a distribution division in the United States. The 
manufacturing division produces an intermediate product and transfers it to the 
distribution division. The distribution division incurs additional costs such as assembly, 
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packaging, distribution or marketing costs and then sells the final product to an unrelated 
party. 
The multinational operates in an imperfectly competitive market and can affect 
the market price and thus the transfer price through production decisions, i.e., selling less 
of the product in the external market causes the selling price, and thus marginal revenue, 
to rise. The multinational also operates under a centralized decision-making framework. 
The transfer price in the model is not used to evaluate division performance. 
First, H&S analyzed the multinational with no taxes and found that the transfer 
price was arbitrary and the multinational should produce where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. Second, H&S introduced taxes to the model and found that when the tax 
rates were equal the result was the same as under no taxes. If the rates were not equal, the 
results depended on which rate was higher. If the foreign rate was lower the 
multinational sets the transfer price to transfer all profit to the foreign country. The 
opposite was true if the foreign rate was higher. As long as the multinational could set 
the transfer price without regulations no production/quantity distortions existed. Upon 
the introduction of regulated methods, resale price and cost plus methods, resource 
allocation distortions were found. 
Under the resale price method, the transfer price is the final product's selling price 
minus a markup. The markup is obtained by multiplying the final product's selling price 
by the gross profit percentage earned by the distributing division on similar final products 
in uncontrolled transactions. 12 An uncontrolled transaction is one that is between the 
distribution division and an unrelated entity. When the foreign rate is lower the 
12 The demands for the controlled product and the similar product are assumed independent in both the 
resale price and cost plus method. 
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multinational has an incentive to set a high transfer price. This is accomplished through 
the production decisions of both the controlled product and the similar final product. 
Production is restricted at the manufacturer to drive up marginal revenue and the 
multinational overproduces the similar final product to reduce the gross profit percentage 
thus keeping the transfer price high. The opposite results occur if the manufacturing 
division has the higher tax rate. 
Under the cost plus method, the transfer price is calculated by adding a gross 
profit to the foreign affiliate's cost of producing the good. The gross profit is found by 
multiplying the cost by the gross profit markup earned by the manufacturing division on 
similar intermediate products in uncontrolled transactions. With a lower foreign tax rate 
the multinational still desires a high transfer price. The multinational restricts trade on 
the controlled product to increase marginal revenue however the multinational now 
underproduces the similar intermediate product to increase the gross profit markup and 
thus keep the transfer price high. The opposite occurs if the manufacturing division has 
the higher tax rate. 
4.2 Mathematical Explanation ofH&S Model 
To implement the analysis first a scenario is developed of the firm including an 
equation representing firm profit. Then, the profit equation is maximized subject to any 
definitions or constraints given in the scenario. Assume a U.S. based multinational (d) 
with a wholly-owned subsidiary (m) in a foreign country.13 Division m produces an 
13 d stands for distributor and m stands for manufacturer. 
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intermediate product, Clm, which is transferred to d, converted into a final product and 
sold. The intermediate product is manufactured using one factor of production Xm, 
whose unit cost is Pm· The term Cim = F(xm), where F(·) is m's production function. 
Decreasing marginal productivity is assumed: 
2 2 
dF/dxm > 0 and d F/dx m < 0. 
Division d purchases Cim at transfer price, r, and then transforms Cim into the final 
product, qd, using an additional factor of production, Xd, whose unit cost is Pd· The term 
qd = G(Cim, xd), where G(·,·) is d's production function. Division d also faces declining 
marginal productivity of both factors of production: 
BG/8 Clm, BG/ 8Xtl > O; a2G;a_ q2m, BG2;a x2d < 0, a2G/8 Cima Xd < 0. 
Assume that Cim and Xd are normal factors of production. The final product, qd, is sold in 
an imperfectly competitive market and yields a revenue Rcl(qd). FO and G(·,) are 
independent functions. 
With no taxes the firm's problem is: 
Maximize 
Xm, Xd, r + ( r'hn - Pmxm) 
subject to: 
qd = G( Cim, Xd), and 
Cim =F(xm). (4.1) 
20 
The first step in solving this problem is to find out whether the transfer price is used to 
maximize profit. This is done below by holding all variables except the transfer price, r, 
constant: 
&/Br= 0 (both terms involving r cancel) (4.2) 
Equation ( 4.2) shows that absent any constraints the transfer price is arbitrary (no unique 
solution exists). Next each one of the factors of production are allowed to vary. 
&loxm = R' d 8G/8~ dF/dxm = Pm 
&/fJxd = R' d 8G/oxd = Pd 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
These equations are the benchmark equations to which many other equations in Chapter 5 
are compared. In words, equations (4.3) and (4.4) reveal that the firm should operate 
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. 
Under differential taxation, with no transfer pricing regulations the firm's problem 
1s: 
Maximize 
Xm, Xd, r 
subject to: 
where 
'td( Rd( qd) - PdXd - r~ 
+ 'tm( r'lni - PmXm) 
qd = G( ~, xd), and 
~=F(xm). 
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(4.5) 
'tm = 1 - effective tax rate of m division 
'td = 1 - effective tax rate of d division. 
If the U.S. tax rate is higher than the foreign tax rate, absent any regulatory 
constraints, the multinational sets a high transfer price so that all profits are in the m 
division. The following is the high transfer price: 
r = <Rd(qd) - Pdxd)/ ~ (4.6) 
Substitution of equation 4.6 and the constraints into equation 4.5 results in the following 
profit function: 
n = 'tm [Rel { G( ~,xd)} - PdXd - PmXnJ (4.7) 
The first order conditions for equation 4.6 are the same as benchmark equations 4.3 and 
4.4. 
If the U.S. tax rate is lower, the multinational sets a low transfer price and all 
profit is in the d division. The transfer price is: 
(4.8) 
Substitution of the transfer price in equation 4.8 and the constraints into equation 4.5 
results in the following profit function: 
n = 'td [Rel { G( ~,xd)} - PdXd - PmxnJ (4.9) 
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The first order conditions for equation 4.9 are the same as benchmark equations 4.3 and 
4.4. Differential taxation by itself does not cause resource allocation distortions. 
Similar to the H&S study this study begins with the basic model with no taxes and 
uses it to make comparisons with taxes and regulated methods. The resource allocation 
distortion is found by this comparison. The primary difference between this study and 
the H&S study is the introduction of tariffs to the model and then the relaxation of the full 
ownership assumption. As noted previously in Sec. 1.4, tariffs and partial ownership are 
important variables to the multinational. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the basic transfer pricing model used in this study. The 
objective of this study is to extend the basic model to consider tariffs and modify it to 
allow for partial ownership. As the theory of the transfer pricing decision in a regulated 
world with prescribed methodology is still in its infancy, this paper contributes by 
expanding the existing theory. 
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CHAPTERV 
TARIFFS 
Tariffs are an important variable to consider for several reasons. First, the 
magnitude of tariffs collected and the potential high rates make this an important variable. 
In 1996 the U.S. Customs Service collected $22 billion in revenues. The average tariff is 
currently around 5%, however some individual rates are much higher. For example, 
tariffs are 151.2% for low-priced watch parts, 458.3% for tobacco stems, and 67% on 
some shoe imports (Bovard, 1998). Second, tariffs are important because they alone can 
change results as seen in the Kant (1988) study discussed in the literature review. Third, . 
tariffs are important to the multinational as shown in the study by Business International 
Corporation and Ernst & Young introduced in Sec. 1.1. The study finds minimizing 
tariffs is one of the key objectives of corporate transfer pricing policies (Business, 1991). 
As discussed in the literature review, tariffs have been a part of the transfer 
pricing literature for quite some time. However, no study to date has examined the 
impact of a tariff and a regulated transfer pricing method combined. The analysis of 
tariffs and taxes with regulated transfer pricing methods follows these analytical 
scenarios: 
Sec. 5.1: A multinational is examined in a world with tariffs, no taxes and no 
mandated transfer pricing rules from U.S. Customs or the IRS. 
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Sec. 5.2: A multinational is examined in a world with tariffs and taxes but still no 
mandated transfer pricing rules. 
Sec. 5.3-4: A multinational is examined in a world with tariffs, taxes and mandated 
transfer pricing rules from U.S. Customs and the IRS. 
The simplest scenario is a multinational in a world with no tariffs, no taxes and no 
rules. This scenario was explored in Chapter 4 from the results of the H&S study. In this 
simplest case the transfer price is arbitrary and the multinational produces where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. In this study, division mis assumed to be wholly-owned 
and functions like a cost center. Division mis assumed to operate in the low tax country. 
In addition the assumption is made of no tax benefits to losses. 14 For purposes of this 
paper, the transfer pricing rules from both U.S. Customs and the IRS are assumed to be 
identical. 
5.1 Tariffs Only 
Introducing tariffs causes the firm's problem to be restated from equation 4.1 as 
follows: 
Maximize 
Xm, Xd, r 
subject to: 
( Rtl(qd)- PdXd - r~- r~t) 
+(r~ -pmxm) 
qd = G( ~' xd), 
~ =F(xm), 
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where 
r::: 0 and 
t::: 0 
t = % tariff levied on transfers into the home country. 
(5.1) 
With the introduction of a tariff, the importing cost of the good is higher. The goal of this 
analysis is to find the transfer price that maximizes total profit. To find this profit 
maximizing transfer price, the constraints are substituted into the profit function, equation 
5.1. The profit function becomes 
(5.2) 
Next the partial derivative with respect to the transfer price is found. 
(5.3) 
The term on the right hand side of equation 5.3 is a negative constant since ~ and tare 
positive. Decreasing the transfer price increases global profit. The transfer price is 
reduced to the smallest possible value, zero. A transfer price of zero minimizes the tariff. 
However it also causes division m to have a loss. Since division m is wholly owned and 
the goal is to maximize global profit, there is no problem with a loss at the divisional 
level. 
To explore the effect on production decisions, the optimal transfer price of zero is 
substituted into the profit function, equation 5.1. The resulting profit function is the same 
14 Without this assumption, the analysis has to include multiple periods. This is left for future research. 
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as equation 4.1. The introduction of tariffs does not cause the multinational to distort 
production. From this analysis, the following proposition is made. 
Proposition 5.1: If tariffs exist without taxes, then no distortions in resource 
allocations occur from the tariff. 
5.2 Tariffs and Taxes Only 
With the introduction of taxes, the multinational' s problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 
Xm, Xd, r 
subject to: 
where 
'td ( Rd( qd) - PdXd - r~- rtCim) 
+ 'tm ( rqm - PmXm) 
qd = G( ~. xd), 
~ =F(xm), 
'td = 1 - effective tax rate of d division and 
'tm = 1 - effective tax rate of m division. 
(5.4) 
The transfer price that maximizes global income is found by substituting the constraints 
into the profit function, equation 5.4. The profit function becomes: 
(5.5) 
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Next the partial derivative with respect to the transfer price is found. 
&/or = Citn('tm - 'td (1 + t)). (5.6) 
5.2.1 Case 1 - Arbitrary Transfer Price 
In the special case, when equation 5.6 is zero, global profit does not change as the 
transfer price changes, therefore the transfer price is arbitrary. This special case occurs 
when either 'tm - 'td (1 + t) or 'hn is equal to zero. The term qm equal to zero means no 
imports, this is not an economically viable situation and is not explored further. Equation 
5.6 is zero when 'tm = 'td (1 + t) or rearrangmg terms when t = (-rm I -rd) - 1. To explore 
the effects on production decisions, the tariff defined in the previous sentence is 
substituted into equation 5.5 and results in the following: 
7t = 'td [Rd { G( 'hn,xd)} - PdXd] - ( 'tm PmXm ) 
The first order conditions are: 
Bnl&m = 'td hm(R' d 8G/8'hn dF/dxm) = Pm 
Brt/oxd = R' d 8G/oxd = Pd 
(5.7) 
These equations are compared to benchmark equations 4.3 and 4.4. Equation 5.8 
above is different from 4.3 by the term 'tdhm, Since 'tdhm < 1, the term in parenthesis 
on the left-hand side of equation 5.8 must increase to maintain equality with the right-
hand side. Since F(xm) is increasing at a decreasing rate by definition, as Xm increases 
the rate at which the factor of production is used, dF/dxm, decreases. The opposite is also 
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true, as Xm decreases the rate at which it is used, by definition, increases. Furthermore as 
Xm decreases, qm decreases causing 8G/8qm to increase. Thus, decreasing Xm is 
required to increase the term in parenthesis on the left-hand side of equation 5.8. In other 
words, imports decrease. This decrease occurs because of the introduction of taxes. 
Intuitively, when a firm encounters taxes, where possible the selling price increases to 
cover the increased cost. Under imperfect competition decreasing the supply causes an 
increase in the selling price. In this model, the supply of the intermediate product is from 
imports. 
Equation 5.9 is the same as benchmark equation 4.4, however the distortion in the 
m division's production function which causes qm to decrease also causes the factor of 
production at d division, Xd, to decrease assuming no outside market for the good and no 
inventories of qm.15 When Xd decreases 8G/8xd increases and qd, decreases. Therefore, 
equation 5.9 is evaluated at a lower level than benchmark equation 4.4. 
In conclusion, when 'tm = 'td (1 + t) imports decrease due to the introduction of 
taxes and the need for a higher selling price. The transfer price is arbitrary and profits 
decrease from the level under tariffs only. Equation 5.7 shows the decrease in profits 
when compared to equation 5.2. 
5.2.2 Case 2 - Low Transfer Price Desired 
When 'tm < 'td (1 + t), the constant is negative and global profit increases as the 
transfer price decreases, thus the optimal transfer price is zero. A transfer price of zero 
15 This assumption also means that exports from m division equal imports at the d division. For simplicity 
in this paper use of the term imports means both imports and exports. 
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causes all revenue to be transferred to the higher tax country but at the same times lowers 
the tariff paid to zero. 
To explore the effect on production decisions, the transfer price of zero is 
substituted into the profit function. The profit function becomes: 
7t = 'td ( Rel( qd) - PdXd ) - PmXm (5.10) 
The term 'tm disappears because the effective tax rate of them division is zero, thus -rm= 
1. 16 After substitution of the constraints, equation 5 .10 becomes: 
n = 'td [Rel { G( ~,xd)} - PdXd]. - PmXm 
The first order conditions are as follows: 
Bnlaxm = -rd (R'd 80/8~ dF/dxm) = Pm 
&laxd = R' d ao1&d = Pd 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
These equations are compared to benchmark equations 4.3 and 4.4. Equation 5.12 
is different from 4.3 by the term 'td, Since 'td < 1, the term in parenthesis on the left-hand 
side of equation 5.12 must increase to maintain equality with the right-hand side. Since 
F(xm) is increasing at a decreasing rate by definition, as Xm increases the rate at which 
the factor of production is used, dF/dxm, decreases. The opposite is also true, as Xm 
decreases the rate at which it is used increases. Furthermore as Xm decreases, ~ 
16 The losses belong to them division with the assumption ofno tax benefits for losses. 
30 
decreases causing 8G/8qm to increase. Thus, decreasing Xm is required to increase the 
term in parenthesis on the left-hand side of equation 5.12. Imports decrease because of 
the introduction of taxes and the need for a higher selling price. 
Equation 5.13 is the same as benchmark equation 4.4, however the distortion in 
the m division's production function which causes qm to decrease also causes the factor 
of production at d division, Xd, to decrease. When Xd decreases 8G/8xd increases and qd, 
decreases. Therefore, equation 5 .13 is evaluated at a lower level than benchmark 
equation 4.4. 
In conclusion, when 'tm < 'td (1 + t) imports decrease due to the introduction of 
taxes and the need for a higher selling price. The optimal transfer price is zero and profits 
decrease from the level under tariffs only. Equation 5.11 shows the decrease in profits 
when compared to equation 5 .2. 
5.2.3 Case 3 - High Transfer Price Desired 
When 'tm > 'td (1 + t), the constant in equation 5.6 is positive and global profit 
increases as the transfer price increases. How far should the transfer price increase? The 
optimal transfer price is the one that transfers all profits to the division with the highest 
tax benefits, in this case 'tm, This transfer price is: 
(5.14) 
At a transfer price higher than equation 5.14, a loss occurs in the d division causing 'td = 
1. When 'td = 1, the constant, in equation 5.6, is positive under the condition 
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'tm > (1 + t). Since 'tm _:s 1, this condition is not possible. Therefore the transfer price 
increases to the point where profit is zero in the d division. 
While tax savings increase as the transfer price increases, tariff savings decrease 
as the transfer price increases. The tradeoff between tax and tariff savings is captured in 
the expression 'td(l + t). The lower tax benefits in the ddivision are inflated by one plus 
the tariff. This tradeoff is reflected by dividing equation 4.6 by (1 + t) thus deflating the 
optimal transfer price under taxes alone to find the optimal transfer price under taxes and 
tariffs. 
To explore the effect on production decisions, the transfer price in equation 5 .14 
is substituted into the profit function in equation 5.4. The profit function becomes: 
7t = 'tm [( Rcl(qd) - PdXd )/ (1 + t) - PmXm] 
After substitution of the constraints, equation 5.15 becomes: 
The first order conditions are as follows: 
&tlaxm = R' d 8G/8~ dF/dxm = Pm0 + t) 
mt/8xd = R' d 8G/8xd = Pd 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
(5.17) 
(5.18) 
These equations are compared to benchmark equations 4.3 and 4.4. Equation 5.17 
is different from 4.3 by the term (1 + t), which increases the expression on the right-hand 
side of equation 5.17. The left-hand side of the equation must increase to maintain 
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equality. For d.F/dxm to increase, Xm must decrease, causing~ to decrease and 8G/8~ 
to increase. Thus decreasing Xm is required to increase the left-hand side of equation 
5.17. Imports decrease because of the introduction of taxes. 
Equation 5.18 is the same as benchmark equation 4.4, however the distortion in 
them division's production function which causes qm to decrease also causes Xd to 
decrease. When Xd decreases, 8G/8xd increases and qd decreases. Therefore equation 
5.18 is evaluated at a lower level than benchmark equation 4.4. 
In conclusion, when 'tm > 'td (1 + t) imports decrease due to the introduction of 
taxes and the need for a higher selling price. The optimal transfer price is the net 
marginal revenue of the final product divided by one plus the tariff and profits decrease 
from the level under tariffs only. Equation 5.16 shows the decrease in profits when 
compared to equation 5 .2. The following proposition combines the results of the 
production decisions under Secs. 5.2.1 to 5.2.3. 
Proposition 5.2: If taxes and tariffs exist, then imports are reduced regardless of the 
relationship between the taxes and tariffs. 
Proof: From Sec. 5.2.1, when 'tm = 'td (1 + t) to maintain equality in equation 5.8, Xm 
was decreased. From Sec. 5.2.2, when 'tm < 'td (1 + t) to maintain equality in equation 
5.9, Xm was decreased. This was also the conclusion in Sec. 5.2.3, when 'tm > 'td (1 + t). 
A decrease in Xm is a decrease in the intermediate product, ~. thus, imports decrease. 
It is also interesting to note that when 'tm > 'td (1 + t) the multinational chooses to 
set a positive transfer price and thus incur tariff payments even without any government 
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regulation. The government could force this outcome by setting t < ( 't'm I i-d ) - 1. 
However, as previously discussed, at 't'm > 't'd (1 + t) the multinational moves all profit to 
the m division thus paying no domestic taxes. Alternatively the tariff could be set at t < 
(i-m I 't'd) - 1, thus forcing a transfer price of zero. No tariff revenue is incurred but the d 
division pays income taxes on revenue with a zero cost basis for the intermediate product. 
Possibly a government could decide which tariff is better by looking at which agency 
does a better job of enforcement. The next step is to add government regulations on the 
transfer price. 
5.3 Resale Price Method 
As was mentioned in Sec. 4.1, the resale price method involves subtracting a 
markup from the selling price of the final product. This markup is obtained by looking at 
the gross profit percentage of similar final products bought and sold by the d division on 
an uncontrolled basis. Assume that the similar final product, qu, has total revenue of Ru 
and total inventoriable cost of Cu. The resale price method states that the transfer price 
should be: 
(5.19) 
The term in square brackets in equation 5.19 comes directly from the regulations and qd 
/qm scales the transfer price in terms of qm. Equation 5.19 simplifies to: 
(5.20) 
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The multinational's problem is: 
Maximize 
subject to: 
'td (Ru - Cu+ Rd(qa) - PdXd - rqm- rqmt) 
+ 'tm ( rqm - PmXm) 
qd = G( ~. Xd), 
qm =F(xm), 
r = (Rd(qd)/qm)(CulRu) and 
t 2: 0. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification equation 5.21 becomes: 
Under the resale price method, the three first order conditions are: 
Bnloxm = R' d BG!Bqm dF/dxm [- t(Cu!Ru)('td I 'tm) + 
(('td I 'tm) - l)Ku + 1] = Pm 
Bnloxd = R' d 8G/8xd [- t(Cu!Ru) + (1 - ('tm I 'td))Ku + 
('tm I 'td)] = Pd 
Bn!Bqu = 'td(R'u - C'u) + ('td t- ('tm - 'td)) 
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(5.21) 
(5.22) 
(5.23) 
(5.24) 
(5.25) 
Where Ku= (Ru - Cu)/ Ru, R'u is qu's marginal revenue, and C'u is qu's marginal cost. 
5 .3 .1 Analysis of first order condition # 1 - Equation 5 .23 
To find whether conditions are different under taxes and tariffs versus taxes only, 
equation 5.23 is compared to the benchmark equation with taxes only. The benchmark 
equation (H&S) is as follows: 
(5.26) 
Equation 5.23 is the same as equation 5.26 except the term - t(Cu/Ru)(td I 'tm) which 
shows the effect of the tariff and is negative. The term in square brackets from equation 
5.26, the tax effect, is positive. 17 
Next equations 5.23 and 5.26 are explored to find the direction of any distortions. 
When Ku, the gross profit percentage of the similar final product, is equal to zero 
equation 5.26 reduces to benchmark equation 4.3 or no resource allocation distortion. 
However with the tariffs when the gross profit percentage is equal to zero, Cu/Ru 
disappears since it is equal to one and equation 5.23, becomes: 
R' d oG/Bqm dF/dxm [1 - t(-rd hm)] = Pm· (5.27) 
As long as t < (-rm I 'td), the term in brackets, from equation 5.27, is less than one 
but greater than zero. The derivatives, 8G/8qm and dF/dxm, have to increase to maintain 
17 This is true as long as the gross profit percentage of the similar product is less than one. 
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the equality. When Xm decreases, dF/dxm increases. The decrease in Xm causes~ to 
decrease and 8G/8qm to increase. The decrease in qm causes a decrease in imports. If t > 
( 'tm I 'td) then the derivative becomes negative and equality is not possible. 
To obtain equality within equation 5.23 without affecting production decisions 
requires a negative gross profit percentage. Notice that when - t(Cu/Ru)('td hm) + 
(('tdhrn) - l)Ku = 0 then equation 5.23 is identical to equation 4.3 and there are no 
resource allocation distortions. Since ( 'tdhm) - 1 is negative, the gross profit percentage 
also has to be negative to even make the above term equal to zero a possibility. A 
negative gross profit percentage is not economically viable, so no distortion is not viable 
under these conditions.18 
As Ku approaches one, which means Cu = 0, the term in brackets in equation 5 .23 
is ('td I 'tm). Under this scenario, the term in brackets in equation 5.26 is also ('td I 'tm), 
As Ku approaches one the tariff effect disappears. The tariff effect, the first term in the 
brackets, becomes smaller negative and the tax effect, the second term in the brackets, 
becomes larger negative. If the tax effect grows faster than the tariff effect then the 
whole term in brackets becomes smaller and the derivatives must increase to compensate. 
If the tax effect grows slower than the tariff effect, then the whole term becomes larger 
and the derivatives must decrease. 
With taxes but no tariffs, as the gross profit percentage approaches one, imports 
decrease. With tariffs imports have already decreased and as the gross profit percentages 
18 See Proposition 5.6 for the possibility ofno additional distortions caused by regulations. 
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approaches one could decrease even further. This occurs when the absolute value of the 
tax effect is increasing more than the absolute value of the tariff effect. To discover what 
happens, the term in brackets from equation 5.23 at a gross profit percentage of zero is 
compared to the term when the gross profit percentage is one. The term in brackets is 1 -
t ( 'Cd I -cm) when the gross profit percentage is zero and ( 'Cd I -cm) when the gross profit 
percentage is one. When ( 'Cdhm) < 1 - t ( 'Cd hm) then imports decrease even further as 
the gross profit percentage approaches one. If ( -cdi-cm) > 1 - t ( 'Cd hm) then imports 
increase as the percentage approaches one. Rearranging terms, when -cm> 'Cd (1 + t), 
imports decrease, imports increase when the opposite is true. Tables IV and V in 
Appendix C, summarize the conclusions of the above analysis. 
Sec. 5.3.2 Analysis of first order condition# 2 - Equation 5.24 
To examine conditions under taxes and tariffs versus taxes only, equation 5.24 is 
compared to the benchmark equation with taxes only. The benchmark equation (H&S) is 
as follows: 
&/8xd = R' d 8G/8xd [(1 - (-cm I -cd))Ku + (-cm I 'Cd)]= Pd (5.28) 
Equation 5.24 is different from 5.28 by the term -t (Cu I Ru) which shows the effect of the 
tariff and is negative. Assuming Ku< 1, the tax only term in equation 5.28 is positive. 
Next equations 5.24 and 5.28 are explored to find the direction of any distortions. 
When Ku equals zero equation 5.28 is (-cm I 'Cd) which is greater than one. Under taxes 
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only 8G/Bxd must decrease to maintain equality. When Xd increases then 8G/Bxd 
decreases. Since they are normal factors of production, a increase in Xd also causes an 
increase in Xm, Therefore, Xm and qm in equation 5.26, under the analysis of them 
division, are evaluated at a higher level than under benchmark equation 4.3 with no taxes. 
In the tax only world, imports are higher than in the no tax world. However, with the 
tariffs, when Ku= 0 equation 5.24 becomes: 
(5.29) 
As long as t < (1:m I 1:d), the term in brackets from equation 5.29 is positive. 
Compared to the tax only world in equation 5.28, imports are lower because (1:m I "Cd) - t 
is less than (1:m I "Cd), To determine how much lower than in the tax only world, equation 
5.29 is compared to the no tax world. When "Cm> "Cd (1 + t), then the term in brackets 
from equation 5.29 is greater than one and 8G/Bxd must decrease to maintain equality, 
thus imports increase from the no tax world. However if "Cm < "Cd (1 + t), then the term in 
brackets from equation 5.29 is less than one and 8G/Bxd must increase, thus imports 
decrease from the no tax world. 
As Ku approaches 1, the term in brackets in equation 5.24 approaches one. The 
term in brackets from equation 5.28 also approaches one. As the gross profit percentage 
of the similar final product approaches one, the tariff effect and the tax effect disappears. 
The tariff effect becomes smaller negative and the tax effect becomes larger negative. 
Imports could either increase or decrease depending on which effect grows faster in 
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absolute magnitude. Comparing terms, as before, when the gross profit percentage is 
zero the term in brackets from equation 5.24 is (tm I 'tel) - t. When the percentage 
approaches one the term from equation 5.24 approaches one. If 'tm > 'td(l + t), then 
imports decrease as the gross profit percentage goes from zero to one. If the opposite 
were true, 'tm < 'td(l + t), then imports increase. Tables VI and VII in Appendix C, 
summarize the conclusions of the above analysis. 
Summary of First Order Conditions # 1 and 2 
From Tables IV to VII and the analysis in Secs. 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, the following 
conclusions are made. Under taxes only, when the gross profit percentage is equal to 
zero, the transfer price is the selling price of the final product. This is evident from 
equation 5 .19. This high transfer price transfers income to the m division thus indirectly 
decreasing their costs of production. When production costs decrease, imports increase to 
id in Tables IV to VII. As the gross profit percentage moves from zero to one, the 
transfer price decreases and now indirectly causes costs to increase and imports to 
decrease to im. This movement is depicted by the top line on the graphs in Tables IV to 
VII. 
The bottom line in each one of the graphs shows what occurs when tariffs are 
introduced. When the gross profit percentage is zero, imports decrease to it, reflecting the 
increased costs of production from the tariff. Imports decrease much more in tables IV 
and V than Tables V and VII. When 'tm < 'td(l + t), the additional costs from the tariff, 
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outweigh the additional income from the transfer price causing the greater reduction in 
imports between the tables. 
As the gross profit percentage moves from zero to one, the transfer price 
decreases. As shown in Tables IV and V, when 'tm < 'td(l + t), imports increase to im 
because the cost of production, from the added tariff, goes down as the transfer price goes 
down. However when 'tm > 'td(l + t), imports decrease to im because indirectly costs go 
up as less income is transferred through the transfer price. In this case, the lower tariff 
does not outweigh the lower income. 
All four tables also show the tariff effect disappearing as the gross profit 
percentage moves from zero to one. Equation 5.19 shows the calculation for the transfer 
price under the resale price,method. When ((Ru - Cu)/Ru), the gross profit percentage, is 
equal to one, thus equation 5 .19 is zero. As the gross profit percentage increases, the 
transfer price decreases to zero. When the transfer price is zero, the firm pays no tariff. 
From this analysis, the following proposition is made. 
Proposition 5.3: If the resale price method is used, as the gross profit percentage of 
the similar final product moves from zero to one, the tariff effect disappears and imports 
are the same in the tax and tariff world as in the tax only world. 
Sec. 5.3.3 Analysis of first order condition# 3 - Equation 5.25 
To examine conditions under taxes and tariffs versus taxes only, equation 5.25 is 
compared to the benchmark equation with taxes only. The benchmark equation (H&S) is 
as follows: 
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(5.30) 
The benchmark for the similar final product is the profit maximizing condition for qu 
which is to. set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost. Substituting R'u for C' u into 
equation 5.30 and then simplifying results in the following: 
- (-rm - 'td) Ra(qd)( R'u I Ru) ((Cul Ru) - 1) (5.31) 
The same substitution is performed in equation 5.25 and results in the following: 
(5.32) 
The only difference between equations 5.25 and 5.30 is the term 'td t which is the tariff 
effect and is positive. The tax effect, - (-rm - 'td), is negative. Equation 5.32 is zero when 
t = ( 'tm I 'td) - 1. If a government wanted to avoid any allocation distortions for the 
similar final product, a tariff could be set to accomplish this purpose. 
To find the direction of any distortions equations 5.31 and 5.32 are compared. 
Equation 5.31 is positive since (CufRu) - 1 is negative. The term, (Cu/Ru) - 1, is negative 
because at the level of qu where R'u = C'u, Ru> Cu, Accordingly, at the level of qu at 
which qu's own profits are maximized, equation 5.32 is positive, which implies that 
overall profits are not being maximized. Equation 5.32 can be driven to zero, by causing 
C' u to rise. This occurs at a point where C' u > R' u, or where more qu is produced than is 
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optimal in the no tax world. Therefore in the tax only world the similar final product is 
overproduced to reduce the gross profit percentage and increase the transfer price. 
The results under taxes and tariffs, equation 5.25, depend on (td t - (-rm - 'rd)). If 
(-rm - 'td) > 'rd t, then equation 5.32 is positive but smaller than in the tax only world. The 
similar final product is still overproduced, to reduce the gross profit percentage, but not as 
much. Intuitively, this makes sense because the presence of the tariff causes the desired 
high transfer price under taxes only, found in equation 4.6, to be deflated by one plus the 
tariff, as in equation 5.14. 
If (-rm - -rd)< 'td t, then equation 5.32 is negative. Accordingly, at the level of qu 
at which qu's own profits are maximized, the left side of equation 5.32 is negative, which 
implies that overall profits are not being maximized. Equation 5.32 can be driven to zero, 
by causing C' u to lower. This occurs at a point where C' u < R' u, or where less qu is 
produced than is optimal in the no tax world. Therefore when (-rm - 'td) < 'td t, the similar 
final product is underproduced to increase the gross profit percentage and decrease the 
transfer price. 
Proposition 5.4: If -rm > 'td (1 + t), the similar final product is overproduced. 
It is also interesting to note that when the similar final product is overproduced 
under taxes and tariffs, the distortion is not as great as under taxes only. When -rm> 'rd 
(1 + t), tariffs reduce the distortion caused by taxes. As previously mentioned, this 
43 
reduction occurs because under taxes and tariffs, the transfer price is not as high as under 
taxes only. 
Proposition 5.5: If 'tm < 'td (1 + t), the similar final product is underproduced. 
This conclusion is different from the one found under taxes only where the similar 
final product was overproduced when 'tm > 'td. 
Sec. 5.4 Cost Plus Method 
As was mentioned in Sec. 4.1, the cost plus method involves adding a markup to 
the cost of the intermediate product. This markup is obtained by looking at the gross 
profit percentage of similar intermediate products manufactured and sold by the m 
division on an uncontrolled basis. Assume that the similar intermediate product, q5, has 
total revenue of Rs and a total manufacturing cost, C5. The cost plus method states that 
the transfer price should be: 
Equation 5.33 simplifies to: 
where CPmxm)lqm is the cost of producing one unit of~. 
The multinational's problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 'td CR<l(qa) - PdXd - r~- r~t) 
+ 'tm ( r~ - PmXm + Rs - Cs) 
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(5.33) 
(5.34) 
subject to: 
qd = G( 'hn, xd), 
'1m =F(xm), 
r = ((pmxm)/qm)(Rs/Cs) and 
t~O. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification equation 5.35 becomes: 
Under the cost plus method, the three first order conditions are: 
onloxm = R' d BGIB'lm dF/dxm [1/(Ls + 1 + Ms)] = Pm 
Brt/oxd = R' d 8G/oxd = Pd 
where 
Ls = t(Rsf Cs) tariff effect, 
Ms= - ((-cm I -cd) - 1) CRs - Cs)/ Cs tax regulations effect, 
R's = qs' s marginal revenue, and 
C's= qs's marginal cost. 
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(5.35) 
(5.36) 
(5.37) 
(5.38) 
(5.39) 
Sec. 5 .4.1 Analysis of first order condition # 1 - Equation 5 .3 7 
To find whether conditions are different under taxes and tariffs versus taxes only, 
equation 5.37 is compared to the benchmark equation with taxes only. The benchmark 
equation (H&S) is as follows: 
&loxm = R'd BGIB~ dF/dxm 1/[1 +Ms]= Pm (5.40) 
Equation 5.37 is the same as equation 5.40 except the term in the denominator, Ls, which 
shows the effect of the tariff and is positive. Ms is the tax effect and is negative. 
Next equations 5.37 and 5.40 are explored to find the direction of any distortions. 
When the gross profit percentage of the similar intermediate product, (Rs - Cs )/ Cs, is 
equal to zero, equation 5.40 reduces to benchmark equation 4.3 or no resource allocation 
distortion. With tariffs, when the gross profit percentage is zero, the term in brackets 
from equation 5.37 is 1/ (t + 1). This term is less than one so the left-hand side of 
equation 5 .3 7 must increase to compensate. This occurs when imports are decreased. 
The relationship between the tax benefits does not matter. 
To obtain equality within equation 5.37, without affecting production decisions, 
the tariff effect must equal the tax effect. Since the tax effect is negative and the tariff 
effect is positive, no distortion is possible only when the gross profit percentage is 
negative. A negative gross profit percentage is not economically viable, so this option is 
not explored further. 
Under taxes but no tariffs, as the gross profit percentage increases, the term in 
brackets in equation 5.40 becomes larger than one. To obtain equality, BG/Bqm dF/dxm 
must decrease. This decrease occurs when imports increase. Under the scenario of taxes 
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and tariffs, the tariff effect, Ls, increases and the tax effect, Ms, increases. Compared to 
the tax only world, imports are lower because the tariff effect increases the denominator 
thus decreasing imports. To determine how much lower imports go than in the tax only 
world, equation 5.37 is compared to the no tax world, equation 4.3. When Ls< Ms then 
the term in brackets in equation 5.37 is greater than one and the left-hand side must 
decrease to maintain equality. To accomplish this imports have to increase. If Ls> Ms 
then the term in brackets in equation 5 .3 7 is less than one and imports must decrease to 
increase the left-hand side. The conclusions presented in this section are illustrated with 
graphs and tables in Tables VIII and IX. 
Sec. 5.4.2 Analysis of first order condition# 2 - Equation 5.38 
Equation 5.38 is the same as benchmark equation 4.4, thus there are no additional 
distortions in this first order condition. However, because of the distortions in imports 
found in Sec. 5.4.1, equation 5.38 is evaluated at a different level. Because no additional 
distortions occur, graphs and tables are not presented for this section. 
Summary of first order conditions #1 and #2 
From Tables VIII and IX and the analysis in Secs. 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, the following 
conclusions are made. The top lines on the graphs in Tables VIII and IX show the effect, 
under taxes only, on imports as the gross profit percentage increase from zero to one. 
The imports initially are at the optimal level, i*, and then increase with the increasing 
gross profit percentage to im. An increasing gross profit percentage causes an increasing 
transfer price. An increasing transfer price, transfers income from m to d, thus indirectly 
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reducing the cost of production at m. A decrease in the cost of production causes an 
increase in production and imports increase. 
The introduction of tariffs causes the cost of production to increase. An increase 
in the cost of production causes a decrease in production and imports decrease to it. The 
bottom lines on the graphs in Tables VIII to IX show the effect on imports, under taxes 
and tariffs, as the gross profit percentage moves from zero to one. The graph in Table 
VIII shows the effect when the tax effect is larger than the tariff effect. As the transfer 
price increases with the increasing gross profit percentage, imports increase to io. The 
increasing transfer price represents increasing income to the m division and thus 
indirectly decreasing costs, causing imports to increase. However, because of the 
increased cost from the tariff, imports do not reach the same level of overproduction as 
under taxes only. 
The graph in Table IX depicts the outcome when the tariff effect is larger than the 
tax effect. As the transfer price increases, the cost of production increases causing a 
decrease in production and thus imports to io. From the analysis above, the following 
proposition is made: 
Proposition 5.6: If the cost plus method is used, then the introduction of the tariff 
causes imports to decrease from the level found under taxes only. 
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Sec. 5.4.3 Analysis of first order condition# 3 - Equation 5.39 
To examine conditions under taxes and tariffs versus taxes only, equation 5.39 is 
compared to the benchmark equation with taxes only. The benchmark equation (H&S) is 
as follows: 
(5.41) 
To analyze the similar intermediate product, the benchmark ofR' s =C's is used. Under 
the cost plus method C's is substituted for R's into equation 5.41 and simplified resulting 
in the following: 
(5.42) 
The same substitution is performed in equation 5.39 and results in the following: 
(('tm - 'td) - 'td t) PmXm( C's I C8) (1 - (Rs I C8)) (5.43) 
The only difference between equations 5.42 and 5.43 is the term, - 'td t, which is the tariff 
effect and is negative. The tax effect, ('tm - 'td), is positive. Equation 5.43 is zero when t 
= ( 'tm I 'ta) - 1. If a government wanted to avoid any allocation distortions for the similar 
intermediate product, a tariff could be set, as indicated before, to accomplish this purpose. 
The find the direction of any distortions, equations 5.42 and 5.43 are compared. 
The first term in equation 5.42 is negative since (1 - (R8 I C8)) is negative at the optimal 
level. All other terms are positive. Since equation 5.42 is negative, the firm increases 
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profits by decreasing qs. Decreasing qs causes an increase in the gross profit percentage 
which, in turn, causes an increase in the transfer price. Therefore in the tax only world 
the similar intermediate product is underproduced to increase the transfer price. 
The results under tariffs, equation 5.43, depend on (('tm - 'td) - 'td t). If (('tm - 'ta) 
> 'td t), then equation 5.43 is negative but smaller than in the tax only world. The similar 
intermediate product is still underproduced but not as much. The term, (('tm - 'ta)> 'td t), 
is equivalent to 'tm > 'td (1 + t). Intuitively, this makes sense because the presence of the 
tariff causes the desired high transfer price under taxes only, found in equation 4.6, to be 
deflated by one plus the tariff, found in equation 5.14. 
If ('tm - 'td) < 'td t, then equation 5.43 is positive. Since equation 5.43 is positive, 
the firm can increase profits by increasing qs. Increasing qs causes a decrease in the 
gross profit percentage which, in turn, causes a decrease in the transfer price. Therefore 
the multinational overproduces the similar intermediate product. The term, (('tm - 'ta)< 
'td t), is equivalent to 'tm < 'td (1 + t). 
Proposition 5. 7: 
underproduced. 
When 'tm > 'td (1 + t), the similar intermediate product is 
It is also interesting to note that when the similar intermediate product is 
underproduced under taxes and tariffs, the distortion is not as great as under taxes only. 
When 'tm > 'td (1 + t), tariffs reduce the distortion caused by taxes. 
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Proposition 5.8: 
overproduced. 
When 'tm < 'td (1 + t), the similar intermediate product is 
This conclusion is different from the one found under taxes only where the similar 
intermediate product was underproduced. 
Proposition 5.9: If t = ( 'tm I 'td) - 1, then all additional resource allocations 
distortions caused by regulations are avoided. 
Proof: Resale Price Method: From equation 5.32 when t = ('tm I 'td) - 1, resource 
allocations distortions for the similar final product disappear. Substituting t = ( 'tm I 'td) -
1 into the other two first order conditions, equations 5.23 and 5.24 results into the 
following. Equation 5 .23 becomes: 
(5.44) 
Equation 5.24 becomes: 
(5.45) 
Cost Plus Method: From equation 5.43 when t = ('tm I 'td) - 1, resource allocations 
distortions for the similar intermediate product disappear. Substituting t = ('tm I 'td) - 1 
into frrst order condition equation 5.37 results in the following19: 
19 The second first order condition, equation 5.38, does not contain t. 
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Bnloxm = R' d 8G/o'hn d.F/dxm ('td I 'tm) = Pm (5.46) 
In Sec. 5.2.1, taxes but no transfer pricing rules, equations 5.8 and 5.9 are the first order 
conditions when t = ('tm I 'td) - 1. Equations 5.44 and 5.45 are identical to 5.8 and 5.9. 
Equation 5.46 is identical to equation 5.8. A government could set a tariff that avoids all 
distortions caused by the use of regulated methods for taxes and tariffs. This conclusion 
is similar to a conclusion in the H&S study where distortions were avoided when 'tm = 
Sec. 5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced tariffs into the basic transfer pricing model outlined in 
Chapter 4. The analysis initially showed that in the absence of transfer pricing 
regulations, introduction of tariffs creates no resource allocation distortions. With the 
introduction of tariffs and taxes, imports are reduced regardless of the relationship 
between the taxes and tariffs. This occurs because in all scenarios the multinational pays 
some level of taxes and the selling price of the final product increases to compensate for 
the higher costs. The transfer price is only arbitrary when 'tm = 'td (1 + t). In addition, 
when 'tm > 'td (1 + t) the multinational chooses to set a positive transfer price and incur 
tariff payments even without government regulation. 
The analysis next moved to the regulated transfer pricing methods. Under the 
resale price method as the gross profit percentage of the similar final product moves from 
zero to one, causing the transfer price to decrease, the effect of the tariff disappears and 
imports are the same as in the tax only world. Under the cost plus method, the tariff 
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causes imports to remain at a level lower than under truces only to keep the transfer price 
from increasing as much. Under both the resale price and cost plus methods of transfer 
pricing regulations, the similar intermediate and final products could be either over- or 
underproduced. Under H&S without the tariff, the similar intermediate and final 
products, at the respective divisions, were overproduced under the resale price method 
and underproduced under the cost plus method. 
Finally the analysis moved to the domestic governments choice of a tariff. When 
the tariff is set to equal ( 'tm I 'td) - 1, all additional resource allocation distortions caused 
by the introduction of regulations are avoided. Under this scenario, the multinational has 
no incentive to move profit from one country to another similar to the situation when 'tm 
= 'td. The government can obtain the best of both worlds by regulating income truces but . 
not causing any distortions in imports. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LESS-THAN WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY 
As was mentioned previously in Chapter 4, a wholly owned subsidiary has been 
assumed. Another possibility is a less than wholly owned subsidiary, which was 
introduced to the economics literature by Kant (1988) and discussed in the literature 
review. Partial ownership is an important variable to study, not only because of the 
results found in Kant (1988) but also because of the frequency of this form of ownership. 
As of 1992, 21 % of the U.S. parents' ownership ofnonbank foreign affiliates was less 
than wholly owned (U.S., 1994). The less than wholly owned affiliates accounted for 
31% oftotal affiliate sales (U.S., 1994). 
No study to date has examined the impact of a less-than wholly owned subsidiary 
and a regulated profits taxation transfer pricing method combined. Division m is the less-
than wholly owned subsidiary in this chapter. The firm's problem is as follows: 
Maximize 
Xm, Xd, r 
subject to: 
qd = G( ~, xd), 
~ =F(xm), 
r 2: 0 and 
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Lm < 1. (6.1) 
where: 
Zb = Before-tax profit vector, 
Z 1 b = ( Ra( qd) - PdXd - rqm) + Lm( rqm - PmXm), parent's before tax profit vector, 
Z2b = (1 - Lm)( r~ - PmXm), co-owner's before tax profit vector andLm = % of m 
division owned by d division. 
The introduction of a less-than wholly owned subsidiary causes the multinational 
to no longer own all of the profits. In the Kant (1988) study, the assumption was made 
that the multinational had complete control over the subsidiary and set the transfer price. 
This assumption is unrealistic. How many individuals enter into a contract with partial 
ownership and give up complete control over revenues? 
To find the transfer price that maximizes profits the constraints are substituted 
into both profit functions in equation 6.1 and results in the following profit functions: 
Z 1 b = (Ra { G( ~.xd)} - PdXd - r~) + Lm( r~ - Pmxm) 
Z2b = (1 - Lm)( rqm - PmXm) 
The partial derivatives with respect to the transfer price are: 
a Z1b/8r = ~ (Lm - 1) 
a Z2bl8r = (1 - Lm)( qm) 
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(6.2) 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
Equation 6.4 is negative since Lm is less than one by definition. Therefore, 
decreasing the transfer price increases profit for the multinational. On the other hand, 
since Lm is less than one, equation 6.5 is positive. Therefore increasing the transfer price 
increases the co-owner's profit. Thus, the co-owners and the d division face conflicting 
incentives. 
What is a reasonable transfer price? If the transfer price is set at zero the co-
owners constantly lose profit and capital, no rational individual would agree to this. If 
the transfer price is set at a transfer price equal to cost, the co-owners only break-even. 
This does not seem reasonable either. The introduction of co-owners causes the 
multinational to have transfer pricing problems before taxes or regulations are introduced. 
The multinational has a legal right to only a certain percentage of the profits as does the 
co-owner with their ownership percentage. A co-owner is likely to be much more 
diligent and interested in obtaining a mutually satisfactory price than a government 
agency ever could be. This may suggest that if co-ownership exists, then government 
regulations are no longer as important. 
To explore these issues, the analysis of a less than wholly owned subsidiary in a 
noncooperative setting follows these steps: 
Sec. 6.1: A multinational is examined in a world with a less-than wholly owned 
subsidiary, where a market price exists for the intermediate good. Initially the 
multinational faces no taxes and no mandated transfer pricing rules. Next taxes are added 
but no transfer pricing rules. Finally, transfer pricing rules are introduced. 
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Sec. 6.2: A multinational is examined with a less-than wholly owned subsidiary, where a 
market price for the intermediate good does not exist. Initially the multinational faces no 
taxes and no mandated transfer pricing rules. Next taxes are added but no transfer pricing 
rules. Finally, transfer pricing rules are introduced. 
Sec 6.1 Less-than wholly owned subsidiary ., market price exists 
As mentioned above the parent and co-owners face conflicting incentives when no 
taxes or transfer pricing rules exist. Whether this conflict affects production and trade is 
explored next. 
6.1.1 No taxes or transfer pricing rules 
When a market price exists, the co-owners are not going to accept less than the 
market price and the d division is not going to pay more than the market price. Since the 
market price is an objective measure, it resolves the conflict between the multinational 
and the co-owner, thus it is the transfer price. As was mentioned before no rational co-
owner would walk into shared ownership with no control over revenues in the subsidiary 
unless the multinational had no control over the revenues either. 
To determine the optimal allocation for the market setting, the transfer price is set 
equal to the market price. The multinationals problem is now as follows. 
Maximize 
subject to: 
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'1m = F(xm), 
r=rm and 
Lm < 1. 
where: 
rm = market price for the intermediate product. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification Z1b is: 
The first order conditions for the d division, equation 6. 7 are: 
B Z1 b/Bxm = R' d BG/8'1.m dF/dxm (1/ Lm) = Pm 
B ZlbiBxd = R' d BG/Bxd = Pd 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
(6.9) 
Equations 6.8 and 6.9 are the benchmark equations. Next the analysis is extended 
to include taxes but no transfer pricing rules. 
6.1.2 Taxes, no Transfer Pricing Rules 
The firm's problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 
Xm, Xd, r 
subject to: 
qd = G( qm, Xd), 
'1m = F(xm), 
58 
r~ 0 and 
Lm < 1. 
where the after tax profit functions are defined as follows: 
Za = after tax profit vector, 
Z1a = 'td ( Rtl(qd)- PdXd - rqm) + 'tm Lm( r~ - PmXm), 
Zza = 'tm (1 - Lm)( r~ - Pmxm), and 
'td and 'tm are as defined in Sec. 5.2. 
(6.10) 
The transfer price that maximizes profit is found by once again substituting the 
constraints into both profit functions and finding the partial derivatives with respect to the 
transfer price. The resulting profit functions are: 
Z 1 a= 'td CRd { G( ~,xd)} - PdXd - rqm) + 'tm Lm( r~ - PmXm) 
Zza = 'tm (1 - Lm)( r~ - Pmxm) 
The partial derivatives are: 
0Z1afor = - ~(-rd - 'tm Lm) 
oZzaf or= (1 - Lm)-rm~· 
Case 1 'rd = 'rm Lm 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
(6.14) 
Under this case equation 6.13 is zero. From the parent's perspective the transfer 
price is arbitrary because the multinational' s profit does not change as the transfer price 
varies. However equation 6.14, which shows the co-owner's incentive, is positive. The 
59 
co-owner wants to increase the transfer price. The optimal transfer price transfers all 
profits to the m division, but goes no higher since 'td equals one at a higher transfer price. 
As seen before this optimal transfer price is (Rtl(qd) - Pdxd)/qm.20 
To explore how d's production decisions are affected, the optimal transfer price 
above and the constraints from equation 6.10 are substituted into Zia· 
The first order conditions are: 
a Z1af8xm = R' d BG/8~ dF/dxm = Pm 
8Zlaf8xd= R'dBG/Bxd = Pd 
(6.15) 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
Equation 6.16 is different from benchmark equation 6.8 by the term 1/Lm, which is 
greater than one. In effect the derivatives in equation 6.16 are multiplied by one, thus 
imports decrease from the optimal level. Equation 6.17 is the same as equation 6.9, thus 
there are no additional distortions from the second first order condition. The introduction 
of taxes causes costs to increase and production to decrease. Even when using the 
optimal transfer price and minimizing taxes, taxes are still incurred but at a lower rate. 
Case 2 'rd > -rmLm 
Under this scenario equation 6.13 is negative; a decrease in the transfer price 
increases d division's income. Equation 6.14 is positive. The co-owners desire a high 
20 See equation 4.6. 
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transfer price since that increases their income. When 't'd > 't'mLm the d division and the 
co-owners have conflicting incentives. For the reasons stated in Sec. 6.1.1, the transfer 
price is set at the market price. After substitution of the market price, rm, and the 
constraints, d's profit function is: 
The first order conditions are: 
8 Z1af8xm = ('t'd I 't'm )R'd BGIBCim dF/dxm (1/Lm) = Pm 
a Zlaf8xd = R' d 8G/8xd = Pd 
(6.18) 
(6.19) 
(6.20) 
The only difference between equations 6.8 and 6.19 is the term 't'd I 't'm which is less than 
one so BGIBCim dF/dxm must increase to maintain equality. This increase occurs when 
imports decrease from the optimal level. As previously explained in Case 1, the 
introduction of taxes causes costs to increase and production to decrease. 
Case 3 7:d < 7:mLm 
In this scenario both equations 6.13 and 6.14 are positive; an increase in the 
transfer price increases profit. The d division and the co-owners have the same 
incentives. Both desire a higher transfer price and want all profits in the m division. The 
optimal transfer price is (Ra(qd) - Pdxd)ICim. The optimal transfer price is identical for 
Cases 1 and 3. Therefore, the first order conditions and the decrease in imports are the 
same in both cases. 
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The analysis for Cases 1 - 3 brings out an interesting question. Can the 
multinational and the co-owners earn more profit in Case 1 or 3 than in Case 2? In Cases 
1 and 3 the multinational's after-tax profit function, equation 6.15 is: 
In Case 2 the multinational's after-tax profit function, equation 6.18 is: 
In Case 2, the multinational pays domestic taxes on the revenue from the final good less 
costs incurred at the d division and the transfer price. In addition, the m division pays 
taxes on the transfer price less costs at the m division. As shown in equation 6.15, in 
Cases 1 and 3 only, them division pays taxes on the revenue from the final good less 
costs at both divisions. The d division pays no domestic taxes, thus earning more after-
tax profits than in Case 2. The co-owners also stand to gain. Although the m division 
pays at the same tax rate in all cases, in Cases 1 and 3 the profit is higher as shown next. 
In Cases 1 and 3, the co-owners after-tax profit function is: 
(6.21) 
In Case 2, the co-owners after-tax profit function is: 
(6.22) 
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As long as Rd{G(<mi,xd)} - PdXd > rm<mi, or in other words as long as the net marginal 
revenue from the final product is greater than the transfer price for the intermediate 
product, the profit is higher. The analysis above leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 6.1: 
when 'td :::: 'tmLm. 
If partial ownership exists, then the multinational earns more profit 
6.1.3 Taxes and Transfer Pricing Rules - CUP method 
With the introduction of transfer pricing regulations, when a market price exists 
for the intermediate good, the multinational must use the CUP method as explained in 
Sec. 2.1. Under the CUP method, the transfer price is the niarket price. The firm's 
problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 
subject to: 
qd = G( Chn, xd), 
Chn = F(xm), 
r=rm and 
Lm< 1. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification equation 6.23 becomes: 
63 
(6.23) 
(6.24) 
The first order conditions are: 
8 Z1af8xm = R' d 8G/8Clm dF/dxm ('ca I (1:m Lm)) = Pm 
az1a1axa = R'a aGtaxa =pa 
Analysis of first order conditions 
(6.25) 
(6.26) 
To find the resource allocation distortion caused by regulations, equations 6.25 
and 6.26 are compared to benchmark equations 6.16 and 6.17. 21 
Case 1 (1:a = 1:m Lm) 
In this scenario, the regulation effect disappears and equations 6.25 and 6.26 are 
the same as equations 6.16 and 6.17. The multinational has no incentive to distort import 
quantities at either division. 
Case 3 1:a < 'Cm Lm 
In this scenario equation 6.25 is different from benchmark equation 6.16 by the 
term (1:a I (1:m Lm)). This term is less than one and 8G/8Clm and dF/dxm must increase to 
maintain the equality. When Xm decreases, 8Gl8Cim and dF/dxm increase, thus imports 
decrease. The introduction of regulations causes the d division to decrease imports. 
Once again equation 6.26 and 6.17 are identical but evaluated at a lower level based on 
the import incentives at the d division. Imports decrease because the regulations force the 
multinational to pay more taxes, thus costs increase the production decreases. 
21 Since less profit is earned in Case 2, only Cases 1 and 3 are analyzed further. 
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From the analysis above of Cases 1 and 3, the following conclusion is made. 
Under -ca < 'tm Lm and -ca = 'tm Lm without regulations the multinational and the co-
owners ignore the market price. As shown above the multinational and the co-owners 
gain a higher profit by using the transfer price that moves all profits to the m division 
even when a market price exists. The domestic government has a powerful incentive in 
Cases 1 and 3 to demand the use of the market price as the transfer price. With 
regulations the domestic government gains tax revenue. The after-tax profit functions are 
the same for each tax situation, however when -ca = 'tm Lm the multinational has no 
incentive to distort import quantities. From this analysis, the following proposition is 
made: 
Proposition 6.2: If-ca .:::: -cmLm, then the domestic government has an incentive to 
require use of the market price as the transfer price. 
Sec 6.2 Less-than wholly owned subsidiary - no intermediate market price exists 
The analysis now turns to the possibility of no market price for the intermediate 
product, whether production and trade are affected is examined next. When no market 
price for the intermediate product exists, the d division and the co-owners are assumed to 
negotiate a transfer"price, r*. 
6.2.1 No Taxes, No Transfer Pricing Rules 
The firm's problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 
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Xm, Xd, r 
subject to: 
where: 
qd = G( ~. xd), 
qm = F(xm), 
r=r* and 
Lm < 1. 
r* = negotiated price for the intermediate product. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification equation 6.27 becomes: 
Z1b = Rd{G(qm,xd)} - PdXd - r*~ + Lm (r*~ -pmxm) 
The first order conditions for the d division are: 
a Z1t/Bxd = R' d BG/a~ dF/dxm (1/ Lm) = Pm 
B Z 1 b/Bxm = R' d BG/Bxd = Pd 
(6.27) 
(6.28) 
(6.29) 
(6.30) 
Equations 6.29 and 6.30 are the benchmark equations. Next the analysis is extended to 
include taxes but no transfer pricing rules. 
6.2.2 Taxes, No Transfer Pricing Rules 
The firm's problem is the same here as in Sec. 6.1.2. In Cases 1 and 3, the d 
division and co-owner's choose the transfer price that moves all profit to them division. 
At the end of Sec. 6.1.2, it was shown that both the multinational and the co-owners earn 
a higher profit under Cases 1 and 3 than Case 2. This leads to a second question: since 
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the multinational and the co-owners choose Lm, are they better off choosing an Lm that 
produces Case 1 or Case 3? The answer to this question is examined next. 
Equation 6.14, the after tax profit function of the d division is: 
The after tax profit function of the co-owners, equation 6.20, is: 
When 't'd = 't'm Lm or rearranging , Lm = 't'd l't'm, by substitution the two profit functions 
become: 
Zia= 't'd (Ra{G(qm,xd)} - PdXd - PmXm) 
Z2a = (i-m - i-d)(Ra{G(~,xd)} -PdXd -pmxm) 
(6.31) 
(6.32) 
The d division indirectly pays the equivalent of the domestic tax rate and the co-owners 
obtain the full benefit of the tax differential. When 't'd < 't'm Lm, then Lm > 't'd l't'm, As 
Lm increases, the d division obtains part of the benefit of the tax differential. Thus the d 
division should choose Lm > 't'd /i-m, The multinational should view Lm = 't'd l't'm as a 
threshold ownership percentage they should not go below. 
Intuitively this result makes sense. When a foreign country has a lower tax rate, a 
multinational can increase after-tax profit when the before-tax profit is taxed at a lower 
rate. However, under partial ownership, the multinational does not own all of the tax 
benefits. At Lm = 't'd I 't'm, the multinational obtains benefits at least equal to what is 
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available in the home country. At Lm = ,:d I ,:m the tax benefits in the two country are 
effectively equalized. To obtain any of the tax differential, the ownership percentage 
must be increased above 1:d li:m, The following proposition is made from the prior 
analysis. 
Proposition 6.3: If the multinational is obtaining an ownership interest in a foreign 
subsidiary, then that ownership interest should be at least equal to 1:d li:m but preferably 
greater than 1:d li:m. 
6.2.3 Taxes and Transfer Pricing Rules - Resale Price Method 
When no market price for the intermediate good exists, the firm must use a 
regulated method as described in Chapter 2. One method is the resale price method, 
where the transfer price is found by subtracting a markup from the final price. Assume 
that the similar final product, qu, has total revenue of Ru and total inventoriable cost of 
Cu. The resale price method states that the transfer price should be: 
(6.33) 
The term in square brackets in equation 6.33 comes directly from the regulations and qd 
/~ scales the transfer price in terms of~- Equation 6.33 simplifies to: 
r = (Ra(qa)/~(CufRu). (6.34) 
The multinational's problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 
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subject to: 
where: 
qd = G( Clm, xd), 
Cim = F(xm), 
r = (Ra(qd)/Cim)(Cu!Ru) and 
Lm < 1. (6.35) 
Zia= 'td (Ru - Cu+ Rd(qd) - PdXd - rCim) + 'tm Lm( rCim - PmXm), parent's after-tax 
profit function with the similar final product. 
All other terms are as previously defined. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification, equation 6.35 becomes: 
The three first order conditions are: 
(6.36) 
(6.37) 
(6.38) 
a Zia /8qu = 'td(R'u - C'u) - (('tm Lm )- 'td)[Ra(qd)(( CuR'u - RuC'u)/ (Ru)2)] = 0, 
(6.39) 
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Where Ku= (Ru - Cu)/ Ru, R'u is qu's marginal revenue, and C'u is qu's marginal cost. 
Analysis of first order condition # 1 - Equation 6. 3 7 
To find the resource allocation distortion caused by regulations, equation 6.37 is 
compared to benchmark equation 6.16. The regulation effect is seen in the term [(('t'di'tm 
Lm) - l)Ku + 1]. When the gross profit percentage is equal to zero equation 6.37 
becomes: 
When the gross profit percentage is equal to one, equation 6.37 becomes: 
a Zia /Bxm = R' d BG/8~ dF/dxm [('t'd/('t'mLm))] = Pm 
Case 1 't'd = 't'mLm 
(6.40) 
(6.41) 
In this scenario, introduction of regulations has no effect on resource allocations 
since equation 6.37 is the same as 6.16. This is true regardless of the gross profit 
percentage of the similar final product. 
Case 3 't'd < 't'mLm 
Equation 6.40 is the same as equation 6.16 and there are no resource allocation 
distortions when Ku= 0. However, when Ku= 1 then the term in brackets, from 
equation 6.41, is less than one and the derivatives on the left-hand side of the equation 
must increase to maintain equality. When Xm decreases, BGIB~ dF/dxm increases thus 
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imports are lower with regulations. As Ku moves from zero to one, the regulation effect 
causes imports to decrease. 
Analysis of first order condition·# 2 - Equation 6.38 
To find the resource allocation distortion caused by regulations, equation 6.38 is 
compared to benchmark equation 6.17. The term in the brackets from equation 6.38, 
[(tm Lm ltd)(l - Ku) + Ku], shows the effect ofregulations. 
When the gross profit percentage is equal !o zero equation 6.38 becomes: 
8 Z1a /oxd = R' d 8G/8xd [(('tm Lm)ltd)] = Pd (6.42) 
When the gross profit percentage is equal to one equation 6.38 becomes: 
(6.43) 
. Case 1 'td = 'tmLm 
In this scenario, equation 6.3 8 is the same as equation 6.17 and the introduction of 
regulations has no effect on resource allocations. This is true regardless of the gross 
profit percentage of the similar final product. 
Case 3 ( 'td < 'tmLm) 
From equation 6.42 when Ku is zero, equation 6.38 is different from equation 
6.17 by the term (('tm Lm)ltd). This term is greater than one and 8G/8xd must decrease to 
maintain equality. When Xd increases, 8G/8xd decreases thus the d division has an 
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incentive to increase imports. From equation 6.43, when Ku is one equation 6.38 is the 
same as equation 6.17. As the gross profit percentage increases the distortion caused by 
regulations disappears. 
Summary of the first order conditions 
Under the resale price method, when the gross profit percentage of the similar 
final product is zero imports increase to a level higher than the situations under no taxes 
and with taxes but without regulations. As the gross profit percentage increases imports 
decrease to a level below the levels found under no taxes and taxes without regulations. 
The similar final product is overproduced. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Tables X and XI. 
Intuitively the mathematical findings are reasonable. From the graphs in Tables X 
and XI, before taxes or regulations imports are at the optimal level, i#. With the 
introduction of taxes, imports decrease from i# to ip, A decrease in imports causes an 
increase in the selling price and thus an increase in the transfer price. As shown in Sec. 
5 .1.2, Cases 1 and 3, a high transfer price is desired with the introduction of taxes. 
Under the resale price method, when the gross profit percentage is zero imports 
are overproduced at ir. At a zero gross profit percentage, the transfer price is the selling 
price of the final good. This high of a transfer price indirectly causes costs of production 
at the subsidiary to decrease drastically. Thus imports increase to a point of 
overproduction. Then as the gross profit percentage increases, imports decrease to is or 
underproduction. As the gross profit percentage increases, the transfer price decreases. 
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Therefore, to maintain a high transfer price imports decrease thus driving up costs of 
production at the m division and the transfer price. 
Analysis of first order condition# 3 - Equation 6.39 
The next step is to analyze the similar final product using equation 6.39. At the 
optimal level, the multinational produces the similar final product where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. Substituting R' u for C' u into equation 6.39 simulates the 
optimal level of the similar final product and results in the following equation: 
- (-rm Lm - -rc:I)Rtl(qd)(( R' uf Ru)((CulRu) - 1) (6.44) 
When equation 6.44 equals zero, the similar final product is produced at the optimal 
level. When equation 6.44 does not equal zero, the production of the similar final product 
is distorted. Equation 6.44 is zero when 'td = 'tm Lm or when (Cu/Ru) = 1 (revenue= 
cost). 
If-rd< 'tm Lm, then equation 6.44 is positive since ((Cu/Ru) - 1) is negative. The 
similar final product is overproduced, to decrease the gross profit percentage, which in 
turn increases the transfer price for the intermediate product. Not only is the production 
level of the intermediate product distorted by regulations but the production level of the 
similar final product is also. 
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6.2.4 Taxes and Transfer Pricing Rules - Cost Plus Method 
Under the cost plus method, a markup based on a similar intermediate product is 
added to the cost of production. The markup is obtained by looking at the gross profit 
percentage of similar intermediate products manufactured and sold by the m division on 
an uncontrolled basis. Assume that the similar intermediate product, q8, has total revenue 
of Rs and a total manufacturing cost, C8• The cost plus method states that the transfer 
price should be: 
and simplifies to: 
r = ((pmxm)/~)(R8/C8). 
where CPmxm)/~ is the cost of producing one unit of qm. 
The multinational's problem is now as follows: 
Maximize 
subject to: 
where: 
qd = G( ~. Xd), 
~ =F(xm), 
r = ((pmxm)/qm)(R8/C8) and 
Lm>O. 
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(6.45) 
(6.46) 
(6.47) 
Z1a = 'td (Rd(qd) - PdXd - r<Im) + "Cm Lm( r'lm - PmXm + Rs - Cs), parent's after -
tax profit function with the similar intermediate product. 
All other terms are as previously defined. 
After substitution of the constraints and simplification equation 6.47 becomes: 
Zia= 'td [Rtl({G(Cim,Xd)} - PdXd)] + PmXm(('tm -,:d)((Rs - Cs)/ Cs)- ,:cl) 
+i;m<Rs-Cs) 
Under the cost plus method, the three first order conditions are: 
8 Z1af8xm = R' d 8G/8<Im dF/dxm [1/(1 - Ks(((,:m Lm)hd)-1))] = Pm 
8 Z1a Bxd = R' d 8G/8xd = Pd 
a Zia /Bqs = (,:m Lm - ,:d)pmxm((CsR' s - RsC' s)ICs2) + 
'tmLm(R' s - C's) = 0, 
(6.48) 
(6.49) 
(6.50) 
(6.51) 
Where Ks = CRs - Cs )/ Rs, R's is qs' s marginal revenue, and C's is qs' s marginal cost. 
Analysis of first order condition# 1 - Equation 6.49 
To find the resource allocation distortion caused by regulations, equation 6.49 is 
compared to benchmark equation 6.16. The regulation effect is seen in the term [1/(1 -
Ks(((,:m Lm)hd) - 1))]. When the gross profit percentage is equal to zero equation 6.49 
becomes: 
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(6.52) 
When the gross profit percentage is equal to one, equation 6.49 becomes: 
a Zia /Bxm = R' d BG/8~ dF/dxm [1/(2- (-rmLm)lta)] = Pm (6.53) 
Case 1 'td = -rmLm 
In this scenario, the introduction of regulations has no effect on resource 
allocations since equation 6.49 is the same as 6.16. 1bis is true regardless of the gross 
profit percentage of the similar intermediate product. 
Case 3 'td < -rmLm 
Equation 6.52 is the same as equation 6.16 and there are no resource allocation 
distortions when Ks is zero. However when Ks is one then the term in brackets, from 
equation 6.53, is greater than one and the derivatives on the left-hand side of the equation 
must decrease to maintain equality'. When Xm increases, BG/8~ dF/dxm decreases thus 
imports are higher with regulations. As Ks moves from zero to one, the regulation effect 
causes imports to increase. 
Analysis of first order condition # 2 - Equation 6. 5 0 
Equation 6.50 is the same as benchmark equation 6.16, thus there are no 
additional distortions at the d division. However because of the distortions in the m 
division, equation 6.50 is evaluated at a different level. 
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Summary of the first order conditions 
When the cost plus method is used, imports initially remain at the same level as 
under taxes but no regulations, but as the gross profit percentage increases imports 
increase. However, imports do not increase as high as the optimal level under no taxes. 
The results of this analysis are presented in Tables XII and XIII. The similar intermediate 
product is underproduced. 
Intuitively the mathematical findings are reasonable. From the graphs in Tables 
XII and XIII, before taxes or regulations imports are at the optimal level, i#. With the 
introduction of taxes, imports decrease from i# to ip, A decrease in imports causes an 
increase in the selling price to offset the increased costs of taxes. As shown in Sec. 5 .1.2, 
Cases 1 and 3, a high transfer price is desired with the introduction of taxes. 
Under the cost plus method, when the gross profit percentage is zero imports are 
underproduced at ip, the same level as under taxes only. At a zero gross profit 
percentage, the transfer price is the cost of producing the intermediate product. At this 
transfer price the costs of production at the m division are not disrupted. However as the 
gross profit percentage moves from zero to one, the transfer price increases, indirectly 
decreasing costs at the m division. This indirect reduction in costs causes imports to 
increase to is. 
Analysis of first order condition # 3 - Equation 6. 51 
The next step is to analyze the similar intermediate product using equation 6.51. 
At the optimal level, the multinational produces the similar intermediate product where 
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marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Substituting C's for R's into equation 6.51 
simulates the optimal level of the similar intermediate product and results in the 
following equation: 
(6.54) 
When equation 6.54 equals zero, the similar intermediate product is produced at the 
optimal level. When equation 6.54 does not equal zero, the production of the similar 
intermediate product is distorted. Equation 6.54 is zero when -rm Lm = 'td or when 
(Cs/Rs) = 1 (revenue= cost). 
If 'tm Lm > 'td, then equation 6.54 is negative sin9e (1 - (Rs/Cs)) is negative. The 
similar intermediate product is underproduced, to increase the gross profit percentage, 
which in turn increases the transfer price for the intermediate product. Not on1y is the 
production level of the intermediate product distorted by regulations but the production 
level of the similar intermediate product is also. 
Sec 6.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced partial ownership into the basic transfer pricing model 
outlined in Chapter 4. The analysis initially shows, even before taxes and transfer pricing 
regulations are introduced, the transfer price is important because of the existence of co-
owners. The combination of taxes and co-ownership allows the multinational to earn 
more revenue when the tax benefits in the domestic country are less than or equal to the 
tax benefits in the foreign country multiplied by the ownership percentage. 
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When a market price exists for the intermediate product and the tax benefits in the 
domestic country are less than or equal to the tax benefits in the foreign country 
multiplied by the ownership percentage, the domestic government gains tax revenue by 
requiring using of the market price through regulations. When the tax benefit and 
ownership percentage relationship is opposite to the one described above, the 
multinational chooses the market price as the transfer price even without regulations. 
The analysis then moved to the choice of an ownership percentage. The 
multinational should obtain an ownership percentage at least equal to the tax benefits in 
the domestic country divided by the tax benefits in the foreign country. However an 
ownership percentage greater than the ratio of the two tax benefits, allows the 
multinational to obtain more of the tax benefits from a lower tax in the foreign country. 
As the gross profit percentage of the similar final product increases, when the 
resale price method is used imports increase to a level higher than under no taxes and 
taxes without regulations and then to a level below the levels found under no taxes and 
taxes without regulations. The similar final product is overproduced. When the cost plus 
method is used, imports initially remain at the same level as under taxes but no 
regulations but then increase. However, imports do not increase as high as the optimal 
level under no taxes. The similar intermediate product is underproduced. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The present study has explored from a theoretical perspective the effect of first 
tariffs and then partial ownership on the production and transfer pricing decisions of a 
multinational. The analysis involves the presentation of the model of a multinational 
facing taxes and transfer pricing regulations. The model was first extended to include 
tariffs. Second, the assumption of full ownership was relaxed to allow for partial 
ownership. The following summarizes the conclusions of this study. 
7.1 Implications of the Tariff Extension 
The initial analysis in the tariff extension showed that absent taxes and transfer 
pricing regulations, no resource allocation distortions result from the introduction of 
tariffs. The tariff itself is not the deciding criteria but rather the regulations of the price 
used to calculate the tariff. When taxes were introduced, imports decreased because of 
the increased costs involved, through the taxes and tariffs. Profits decreased even when 
using the optimal transfer price. 
Under regulations, the multinational can decrease tariffs incurred by increasing 
the gross profit percentage ofthe similar final product under the resale price method. 
Tariffs cause imports to be lower when the cost plus method is used. Tariffs also caused 
80 
the distortion for the similar intermediate and final products to be opposite to that found 
under taxes only. 
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the tariff extension is the determination of a 
tariff which a domestic government could use to remove resource allocations while 
keeping regulations intact. Prior studies, for example H&S, have shown that when the 
tax benefits between two countries were equal no distortions occurred. The tariff gives 
regulators another tool to use in decreasing the distortions caused by regulations. 
7.2 Implications of the Less-than Wholly Owned Subsidiary Model 
Initially, the analysis showed that the presence of co-owners causes the transfer 
price to be important before taxes or regulations exist. The multinational still has 
opportunities to manipulate income through the transfer price however this opportunity 
does not exist in a non-cooperative setting when the tax benefit in the domestic country is 
higher than the tax benefit in the foreign country multiplied by the ownership percentage. 
When the scenario in the prior sentence exists, the multinational chooses to use the same 
transfer price as in the regulations. This results has important implications for tax 
regulators in knowing when the potential for abuse does not exist. 
The most notable aspect of the partial ownership analysis in this study is the 
choice of an ownership percentage. Obtaining an ownership percentage, at least equal to 
the ratio of the tax benefits in the domestic country to the foreign country, allows the 
multinational to in effect equalize the tax benefits between the two countries. From that 
point, to obtain part of the tax differential and increase profits, the multinational should 
increase the ownership percentage. This has important implications for both 
81 
multinationals and regulators. For the multinational, a breakeven ownership percentage 
is designated. For the regulators, this breakeven ownership percentage can be viewed as 
the point where transfer price abuses are more likely to begin. 
7.3 Limitations and Extensions of the Study 
The first extension of this study could be to revise the model of the multinational 
presented here to include both tariffs and partial ownership. Also, the implications of the 
analytical results of this study are limited by the use of a one period model. In a single 
period model, there are no tax benefits to losses. Allowing these tax benefits might 
extend this study. Another assumption of the model presented here is use of the same 
transfer price for both taxes and tariffs. The regulations for tariffs do allow some 
differences. 
In 1986 Congress enacted Sec. 1059A in the federal income tax code. This 
section states that the transfer price for income tax purposes cannot be greater than the 
transfer price declared for customs purposes. If a taxpayer reports the same value to both 
customs and the IRS or a greater value to customs, then the taxpayer doesn't have to 
worry about problems with Sec. 1059A. This section also requires the IRS to share 
information with customs on the income tax values so both can find true tax liabilities 
when the taxpayer is under an audit. The IRS and customs face conflicting incentives 
concerning the transfer price. The IRS wants a low transfer price so there is more income 
to tax and customs wants a high transfer price to increase tariff revenue. An interesting 
extension of this study could be to analyze these conflicting incentives using game 
theory. From the perspective of the government, using agency theory, with the firm's 
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profit function as a constraint, possibly a revenue maximizing combination of tax rate and 
tariff could be found. 
Another extension could be to explore whether the IRS implicitly limits the use of 
side payments between owners by requiring a certain transfer price such as the market 
price to be used. Without a doubt the multinationals and the co-owners could cooperate 
and thus both would gain. The relationship between the multinational and co-owners 
could also be explored using game theory. 
Based on the analytical conclusions showing the importance of tariffs and partial 
ownership, empirical extensions of the model could be done to explore whether decision 
makers understood this importance. Does the IRS realize that with partial ownership, 
regulations might not be as necessary in certain situations? With the high cost of auditing 
corporate returns, knowing when manipulations might not be as prevalent, could be 
useful information. Does the multinational understand the importance of other variables 
in the transfer pricing decision? They definitely have every incentive to understand this 
importance. Possibly the existence of these other variables explains the inability to reach 
conclusive results in studies of multinationals. For instance the GAO study cited in Sec. 
1.1.2 might have been better able to tie transfer pricing abuses to zero taxes being paid. 
A final possible empirical extension is testing the theory developed concerning 
ownership percentages in Propositions 6.1 and 6.3. Ownership percentages could be 
examined to see if more partial ownerships exist in situations that follow Cases 1 and 3. 
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APPENDIX A 
NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION OF SOLUTIONS TO TARIFF EXTENSION 
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate examples of the solutions to the 
multinational's profit maximization problems presented in this paper. The basic model 
assumptions used in these examples are outlined in Chapters 4 and 5. 
For this illustration, the elements of the profit function are described as follows: 
Rei( qd) - PdXd or NMR = $800 
Pmxm=$50 
qdand~ = 100. 
't'm=.8 
't'd=.6 
t = varies 
TI d, m = taxable income at the d and m division, respectively 
NI d, m = net income at the d and m division, respectively 
Global = global profit 
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A.1 High Transfer Price, Taxes Only Equation 4.6 
When 'tm > 'td as shown in equation 4.6 a high transfer price is desired to move 
all profits to the m division. The high transfer price is the net marginal revenue divided 
by the quantity transferred. The following example illustrates this concept. Throughout 
this appendix, the row in bold represents the scenario with maximum profit. 
R NMR Rqm PmXm Tid Nld Tim Nlm Global 
10 800 1000 (50) (200) (200) 950 760 560 
9 800 900 (50) (100) (100) 850 680 580 
8 800 800 (50) 0 0 750 600 600 
7 800 700 (50) 100 60 650 520 580 
6 800 600 (50) 200 120 550 440 460 
A.2 Tariffs Only, Zero Transfer Price Desired Equation 5.3 
When tariffs are introduced to a firm's profit function before taxes or regulations, 
the optimal transfer price is zero. A zero transfer price negates the tariff. The tariff for 
this example is assumed to be 100%. 
r NMR R~(l +t) r~ PmXm Nld Nlm Global 
3 800 600 300 (50) 200 250 560 
2 800 400 200 (50) 400 150 550 
1 800 100 100 (50) 600 0 600 
0 800 0 0 (50) 800 (50) 750 
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A.3 Tariffs and Taxes, Arbitrary Transfer Price Sec. 5.2.1 
When 'tm = 'td(l + t), the transfer price is arbitrary. This scenario holds whether 
regulations exist or not. The tariff for this example is assumed to be 33%. No row is in 
bold since the global profit is identical for all transfer prices. 
r NMR rCim(l + t) r'hn PmXm Tld Nld Tim Nim Global 
4 800 533 400 (50) 267 160 350 280 440 
3 800 400 300 (50) 400 240 250 200 440 
2 800 267 200 (50) 533 320 150 120 440 
1 800 133 100 (50) 667 400 50 40 440 
A.4 Tariffs and Taxes, Zero Transfer Price - Sec. 5.2.2 
When 'tm < 'td(l + t), the transfer price is zero. Once again a zero transfer price 
negates the tariff and moves all profit to the domestic country. The tariff for this example 
is assumed to be 50%. 
r NMR rqm(l +t) r'hn PmXm Tld Nid Tim Nim Global 
4 800 600 400 (50) 200 120 350 280 400 
3 800 450 300 (50) 350 210 250 200 410 
2 800 300 200 (50) 500 300 150 120 420 
1 800 150 100 (50) 650 390 50 40 430 
0 800 0 0 (50) 800 480 0 0 480 
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A.5 Tariffs and Taxes, High Transfer Price Sec. 5.2.3 
When 'tm > 'td(l + t), the optimal transfer price is the one that transfers all profits 
to the m division. The transfer price is NMR I Cim.0 + t). Substituting the data given at 
the beginning of Appendix A to the transfer price in the prior sentence gives an optimal 
transfer price of 7 .27. The tariff for this example is assumed to be 10%. 
r NMR rqm(l +t) rCim PmXm Tld Nld Tim Nim Global 
9 800 990 900 (50) (190) (190) 850 680 490 
8 800 880 800 (50) (80) (80) 750 600 520 
7.27 800 800 727 (50) 0 0 677 542 542 
7 800 770 700 (50) 30 18 650 520 538 
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APPENDIXB 
NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION OF SOLUTIONS TO LESS THAN WHOLLY-
OWNED SUBSIDIARY MODEL 
The purpose of this appendix is to illustrate examples of the solutions to the 
multinational's profit maximization problems presented in this paper. The basic model 
assumptions used in these examples are outlined in Chapter 6. 
For this illustration, the elements of the profit function are described as follows: 
Rei( qa) - PdXd = $800; NMR 
PmXm =$50 
qaand~ = 100 
'tm = .8 
'td = .6 
L m =varies 
rm=2 
Tia, m = taxable income at the d and m division, respectively 
Nia, m = net income at the d and m division, respectively 
Lm Nim= d division's share ofm division income 
Zia= d division's total profit from Nia and Lm Nim 
Z2a= co-owner's share of m division income 
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B.1 High Transfer Price, Case 1 Sec. 6.1.2 
When "Cd = "Cm L m the optimal transfer price transfers all profits to the m division 
and is the NMR divided by the quantity transferred in this case 100. For this example L 
mis assumed to be .75. The following example illustrates this concept. As in Appendix 
A, the row in bold represents the profit maximizing scenario. 
r NMR rqm Pmxm Tid Nld Tim Nlm LmNim Zia Z2a 
8 800 800 (50) 0 0 750 600 450 450 150 
7 800 700 (50) 100 60 650 520 390 450 130 
6 800 600 (50) 200 120 550 440 330 450 110 
5 800 500 (50) 300 180 450 360 270 450 90 
B.2 High Transfer Price, Case 3 Sec. 6.1.2 
When "Cd< -cm L m the optimal transfer price transfer all profits to them division. 
This optimal transfer price is the net marginal revenue divided by the quantity transferred. 
For this example Lm is assumed to be .80. The following example illustrates this 
concept. 
r NMR rqm Pmxm Tid Nld Tim Nlm LmNim Z1a Z2a 
8 800 800 (50) 0 0 750 600 480 480 120 
7 800 700 (50) 100 60 650 520 416 476 104 
6 800 600 (50) 200 120 550 440 352 472 88 
5 800 500 (50) 300 180 450 360 288 468 72 
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B.3 Higher Earnings in Cases 1 and 3 than Case 2 - Proposition 6.1 
To show that earnings are higher in Cases 1 and 3 than Case 2, the optimal 
solutions to each one are presented below. Cases 1 and 3 are repeated from B.1 and B.2 
above. In Case 2, 'td > 'tm L m, the transfer price is the market price because of the 
conflicting incentives between the d division and the co-owners. For the Case 2 example 
Lm is assumed to be .6. As shown below the profits are higher for both the d division 
and the co-owner's in Cases 1 and 3. 
Case 1 
r NMR RCim PmXm Tia NI a Tim Nlm LmNim Z1a Z2a 
8 800 800 (50) 0 0 750 600 450 450 150 
Case2 
r NMR Rqm PmXm Tia NI a Tim Nim LmNim Z1a Z2a 
2 800 200 (50) 600 360 150 120 72 432 48 
Case3 
r NMR Rqm PmXm Tia NI a Tim Nim LmNim Z1a Z2a 
2 800 200 (50) 0 0 750 600 480 480 120 
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B.4 Case 3 Preferable to Case 1 Proposition 6.3 
The first step in this example is to show the profit in each division if the market 
price was the transfer price. This is seen in Case 2 above where Nld = $3 60 and Nim = 
$120 for a total profit of $480. At a high transfer price of $8, that takes advantage of the 
lower tax benefits in the foreign country, total profit is found by adding n1 + n2 in Case 1 
or Case 3. The total profit if $600. The tax benefit is the difference between the total 
profit amounts or $120. Equations 6.31 and 6.32 show the profit split between the d 
division and the co-owner's. After substituting the numerical values used in Case 1, 
equation 6.31 and 6.32 become: 
Z2a = .6 ($800 - 50) = $450 
Z1a = (.8-.6) ($800 - 50) = $150 
In Case 1 using the market price as the transfer price, the profit split is: 
r NMR r~ PmXm Tia Nia Tim Nim LmNim Z1a Z2a 
2 800 200 (50) 600 360 150 120 90 450 30 
When the multinational takes advantage of the tax differential and uses the high transfer 
price of $8, the profit split is the same as Case 1 above, presented again for ease of 
companson. 
r NMR r~ PmXm Tia Nia Tim Nim LmNim Z1a Z2a 
2 800 800 (50) 0 0 750 600 450 450 150 
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The tax differential of $120 goes to the co-owner's. However when the ownership 
percentage is chosen under the requirements of Case 3, the d division now obtains more 
of the tax differential and the co-owner's less. Case 3 is also presented again for ease of 
comparison. 
r NMR r~ PmXm Tid Nld Tim Nim LmNim Z1a Z2a 
2 800 800 (50) 0 0 750 600 480 480 120 
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APPENDIXC 
TABLE I 
Tran sf er Pricing Court Case Decisions 
Multinational Year's Year IRS Assessed %Allowed 
In Issue Settled Deficiency (millions} by Court 
Altama Delta 1985 - 87 1995 $ 1.5 50 
Seagate 1981 - 87 1994 $ 110.0 15 
Technology 
National 1978 - 82 1994 $ 122.2 33 
Semiconductor 
Perkin-Elmer 1975 - 81 1993 $ 26.1 21 
Exxon 1980 - 82 1993 $6,800.0 0 
Proctor & 
Gamble 1978 - 79 1992 $ 1.9 0 
Westreco 1978 - 82 1992 $ 8.8 0 
Sunstrand 1977 - 78 1991 $ 15.2 12.5 
Merck&Co 1975 - 76 1991 $ 4.9 0 
Bausch& 1979 - 82 1989 $ 29.8 17 
Lomb 
Eli Lilly 1971 - 73 1988 $ 71.0 32 
G.D. Searle 1974 - 75 1987 $ 57.8 31 
Total $7,249.2 * 
* Average percentage of proposed adjustment allowed - 1.5% 
(If Exxon excluded- 24.6%) 
Sources on next page 
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Sources: 
Altama Delta Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 22 
Seagate Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149 
National Semiconductor Corp. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2849 
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 634 
Exxon Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1707 
Proctor & Gamble v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 323 (1990), affd, 961 F.2d 1255 
Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 849 
Sunstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226 
Merck & Co., Inc., v. United States, 24 Cl.Ct 73, 91-2 USTC 50,456 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084 
Eli Lilly & Co., v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and 
remanded, 856 F.2d 855 
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 25 
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TABLE II 
A Breakdown of Transfer Pricing Methods by Respondent Firms* 
Pricing Method 
Cost-based 
transfer prices 
Full Cost Plus markup 
Other 
Total Cost-based 
Market-based 
transfer prices 
Market Price 
Market Price 
less margin 
Other 
Total Market-based 
Other (includes 
negotiated price) 
Total - all methods 
Source: Tang, 1993 
Domestic 
Transfer Prices 
16.6% 
29.6 
46.2% 
25.1 
7.6 
4.0 
36.7% 
17.1 
100.0% 
*Survey done in 1990 included 143 firms 
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International 
Transfer Prices 
26.8% 
14.6 
41.4% 
26.1 
12.1 
7.7 
45.9% 
12.7 
100.0% 
TABLE III 
Numerical Examples of Transfer Pricing Methodologies 
Resale Price of Final Product= $75 
Affiliate's Cost of Production= $20 
Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method 
Affiliate's Sales Price to Unrelated Buyers: 
Buyer # 1 = $46 
Buyer # 2 = $50 
Buyer# 3 = $55 
Arm's Length Range= $46 to $55; Median= $50 
Transfer Price to Parent = $50 
Assumption: Sales to unrelated parties are comparable. 
Resale Price Method 
Parent's Gross Profit on Sales of Unrelated Manufacturer's Products: 
Product# 1 = 30% 
Product# 2 = 33.3% 
Product# 3 = 35% 
Arm's length range= 30% to 35%; Median= 33.3% 
Transfer Price to Parent = Resale Price less gross profit 
$75 - (33.3% * 75) = $50 
Assumption: Sales used in calculation of gross profit defined as comparable. 
Cost Plus Method 
An analysis of sales between affiliate and other buyers of unrelated products and 
between sales of unrelated manufacturers and buyers in the same industry 
segment yields a standard markup of 150%. 
Transfer Price to Parent= Affiliate's cost of production+ Standard Markup 
$20 + (150% * 20) = $50 
Assumption: Sales used in calculation of standard markup defined as comparable. 
Source: Sherman & McBride, 1995 
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TABLE IV 
Conclusions of Resale Price Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 1 
Sec. 5.3.1 
When Ku=O Ku= 1 
'tm < 'td (1 + t) 
no taxes no distortion no distortion 
imports at i * imports at i * 
taxes only imports increase from · imports decrease from 
i* to id id to im 
taxes and tariffs imports decrease from imports increase from 
id to it it to im 
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TABLEV 
Conclusions of Resale Price Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 1 
Sec. 5.3.1 cont. 
When Ku=O Ku=l 
'tm > 'td (1 + t) 
no taxes no distortion no distortion 
imports at i * imports at i * 
taxes only imports increase from i * imports decrease from id 
to id toim 
taxes and tariffs imports decrease from id imports decrease from it 
to it to im 
i* 
1 ~ 
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TABLE VI 
Conclusions of Resale Price Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 2 
Sec. 5.3.2 
When Ku=O Ku= 1 
'tm < 'td (1 + t) 
no taxes no distortion no distortion 
imports at i * imports at i * 
taxes only imports increase from imports decrease from 
i* to id id to im 
taxes and tariffs imports decrease from imports increase from 
id to it it to im 
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TABLE VII 
Conclusions of Resale Price Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 2 
Sec. 5.3.2 cont. 
When Ku=O Ku= 1 
't'm> 't'd (1 +t) 
no taxes no distortion no distortion 
imports at i * imports at i * 
taxes only imports increase from imports decrease from 
i* to id id to im 
taxes and tariffs imports decrease from imports decrease from 
idtO it it to im 
. 
1t 
i* 
1 ~ 
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TABLE VIII 
Conclusions of Cost Plus Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 1 
Sec. 5.4.1 
When Ks=O Ks= 1 
Ls<Ms 
no taxes no distortion imports no distortion imports 
at i* ath 
taxes only no distortion imports imports increase from 
at i* i* to im 
taxes and tariffs imports decrease from imports increase from 
i* to it it to i0 
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TABLE IX 
Conclusions of Cost Plus Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 1 
Sec. 5.4.1 cont. 
When Ks=O Ks= 1 
Ls>Ms 
no taxes no distortion imports no distortion imports 
ath at i* 
taxes only no distortion imports imports increase from 
at i* i* to im 
taxes and tariffs imports decrease from imports decrease from 
i* to it it to i0 
i* 
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TABLEX 
Conclusions of Resale Price Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 1 
When 
'td <'tmL m 
no taxes 
taxes, no 
regulations 
taxes & 
regulations 
1r 
i# 
Sec. 6.2.3 
Ku=O Ku= 1 
no distortion no distortion 
imports at i# imports at i# 
imports decrease from imports decrease from 
i# to ip i# to ip 
imports increase from imports decrease from 
ip to ir ir to is 
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TABLE XI 
Conclusions of Resale Price Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 2 
When 
'td <1:mL m 
no taxes 
taxes, no 
regulations 
taxes & 
regulations 
1r 
i# 
Sec. 6.2.3 
Ku=O Ku=l 
no distortion no distortion 
imports at i# imports at i# 
imports decrease from imports decrease from 
i# to ip i# to ip 
imports increase from imports decrease from 
ip to ir ir to is 
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TABLE XII 
Conclusions of Cost Plus Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 1 
When 
'td <'tmL m 
no taxes 
taxes, no 
regulations 
taxes & 
regulations 
i# 
1s 
Sec. 6.2.4 
Ks=O Ks= 1 
no distortion no distortion 
imports at i# imports at i# 
imports decrease from imports decrease from 
i# to ip i# to ip 
imports remain at ip imports increase from 
ip to is 
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TABLE XIII 
Conclusions of Cost Plus Method Analysis of First Order Condition # 2 
Sec. 6.2.4 
When Ks=O Ks= 1 
'td <-cm L m 
no taxes no distortion no distortion 
imports at i# imports at i# 
taxes, no imports decrease from imports decrease from 
regulations i# to ip i# to ip 
taxes & imports remain at ip imports increase from 
regulations ip to is 
i# 
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m 
Pm 
d 
r 
r* 
Pd 
G( .. ) 
' 
R<i (qd) 
7t 
't'd,m 
t 
TABLE XIV 
SUMMARY OF NOTATION 
= manufacturer subsidiary in foreign country 
= factor of production at m division 
= unit cost of Xm 
= m's production function 
= intermediate product 
= distribution subsidiary in domestic country 
= transfer price m charges d 
= negotiated transfer price 
= market price for the intermediate product 
= final product 
= factor of production at d division 
= unit cost of Xd 
= d's production function 
= revenue function at d division 
= profit function 
= tax benefit at d and m divisions, respectively 
= % tariff levied on transfers to d division 
= similar final product at d division 
= total revenue from qu 
= total inventoriable cost of qu 
= qu' s gross profit percentage 
= similar intermediate product at m division 
= total revenue from qs 
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Cs = total inventoriable cost of qs 
Ks = qs's gross profit percentage 
Ls = tariff effect in the Cost Plus Method 
Ms = tax effect in the Cost Plus Method 
Lm = % of m division owned by d division 
Zb = global before tax profit 
Z 1 b = parent's before tax profit function 
Z2b = coowner's before tax profit function 
Za = global after tax profit 
Zia = parent's after tax profit function 
Z2a = co-owner's after tax profit function 
I* = optimal level of imports under tariffs 
Id = imports under taxes only, Ku= 0 
Im = imports under taxes only and taxes & 
tariffs, Ku, Ks = 1 
It = imports under taxes & tariffs, Ku, Ks = 0 
Io = imports under taxes and tariffs, Ks = 1 
i# = optimal level of imports, partial ownership 
Ip = imports under taxes no regulations, partial 
ownership 
Ir = imports under taxes and regulations, partial 
ownership, Ku, Ks = 0 
Is = imports under taxes and regulations, partial 
ownership, Ku, Ks = 1 
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